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This thesis explores 1) the ways that three Vietnamese infrastructure 
development projects undermine their cities’ climate change adaptation goals and 
2) the political and economic forces driving these developments.  In-depth
interviews highlight four main perspectives of planners and decision makers, which 
explain why these infrastructure projects often undermine cities’ climate resilience 
goals. I describe how the mainstream climate change adaptation planning approach, 
with its emphasis on participatory planning, good governance and green growth, 
implicitly reinforces the neoliberal growth model, even as it seeks to ameliorate the 
inequality and ecological destruction that such a growth model creates. My research 
reveals how Vietnam’s growth-first economic model and its dependence on 
international finance means that its climate adaptation priorities are increasingly 
shaped by the interests of financial institutions, and not necessarily the public 
interest. I argue that even if the strategies proposed by Vietnamese planners and 
climate adaptation practitioners are adopted, maladaptive projects will continue in 
Vietnam, unless the underlying economic growth imperative is addressed. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
On November 4, 2017, Typhoon Damrey struck Vietnam and killed over 106 
people, and affected about four million people across fourteen provinces in central 
and southern Vietnam. Less than a week later on Nov 10, 2017, Vietnam hosted the 
final convening of the yearlong Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings 
in Da Nang Vietnam, one of the cities directly impacted. Despite the still-emergency 
conditions which had left many poor communities without clean water supplies, the 
Vietnamese leaders made no comment about the devastating and deadly floods. The 
speeches and opening remarks by Vietnamese and other world leaders emphasized 
the growing prosperity that would arise from increased global trade integration. 
Even as Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang mentioned the need to build 
climate resilience, his speech and the speeches of others ignored the fact that the 
hotel resort where the world leaders are staying, located in the heart of Son Tra 
Nature Reserve, is a stark example of the very kind of development in natural areas 
that increases Vietnam’s vulnerability to climate change. In fact, the Frankfurt 
Zoological Society warned earlier in March of 2017, that if hotel and resort 
construction in the Nature Zone did not stop, the green Son Tra rainforest, also 
called the “lungs of Danang” would become a desert and threaten many endangered 
species with extinction within the next thirty years (Voice of Vietnam 2017). Indeed, 
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the remarks from President Trump and other world leaders staying at the 
Intercontinental Hotel implied that the economic development discussions and 
actions spurred by APEC had little connection to the intensified flooding, droughts, 
and hurricanes that have struck Vietnam over the past decade.   
APEC is not alone in failing to connect the dots between economic 
development and climate change vulnerability. A brief scan of climate change 
adaptation literature—from World Bank and NGO reports, to academic journal 
articles and books—reveals that discussions of economic development strategy and 
climate change adaptation are usually kept separate. When they are discussed 
together, there is often an assumption and assertion that there is no contradiction 
between the two goals. For example, Korean and Japanese development agencies 
such as KOICA and JICA, have increasingly been promoting “green growth” as a 
strategy to both adapt to climate change and promote economic development. 
Similarly, popular conceptions of the “three foundations of sustainability” (social 
equity, economic prosperity, and environmental protection) generally ignore the 
conflicts or tensions between the three goals. 
Despite the increased attention to Vietnam’s tremendous vulnerability to 
climate change, urban development is actually going in the opposite direction: 
increasing development into critical farmland, wetlands, floodplains, and coastal 
ecosystems that undermines a city’s ability to protect itself from sea level rise, 
flooding, and superstorms. This paper examines firstly, how urban and 
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infrastructure developments are undermining climate adaptation strategies, and 
secondly, why economic development strategies are frequently undermining 
climate resilience strategies. This thesis addresses the gap in the climate change 
adaptation planning literature and explains how economic development strategies 
are inextricably connected to climate change adaptation strategy because economic 
and urban development decisions clearly and directly impact a city’s ability to build 
their climate resilience.  
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Research Questions and Methodology 
This thesis explores two key research questions:  1) how are Vietnamese 
infrastructure development projects impacting cities’ climate change adaptation 
goals and 2) what are 
the economic forces driving these development projects? My primary research 
methods involved 1) ten in-depth qualitative interviews conducted in-person and 
via Skype, and 2) document analysis of key Vietnamese documents, reports, and 
articles about economic development, urban infrastructure development, and 
List of Interview Participants 
Government planners and officials 
• Head of Urban Development Management Division, Ministry of Construction 
• Researcher, Development Studies Institute, Ministry of Planning and 
Investment 
• Deputy Director General, Vietnam Institute for Urban and Rural Planning 
• Strategic Planner, Urban Development Division, Ministry of Construction 
• Director, Institute of International Cooperation, Academy of Managers of 
Construction 
Academic Researchers 
• Professor, Academy of Planning and Development 
• Professor, Climate Change and Development Program, Vietnam-Japan 
University 
Non-governmental organizations (NGO) workers 
• Technical Lead, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, 
International 
• Technical Consultant, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, 
International 
• Director, UN-HABITAT Vietnam 
FIGURE 1: LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
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climate change adaptation. I reviewed both national and local climate adaptation 
plans and reports, as well as contemporary newspaper and journal articles to gain 
some more background on the projects and examples which my interview subjects 
discussed. My interview subjects included a variety of planners, decision-makers 
and stakeholders engaged in climate change or urban development work in 
Vietnam, including: planners in the Ministry of Construction, planners in the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, professors of climate change and 
development, and NGO staffers working on climate change and development (see 
Figure 1). To protect their privacy, I include the government institutions, but not the 
specific names of the people, unless they expressly provided permission.   
My research questions were shaped by my experience working in Vietnam as 
an intern for two non-governmental organizations working on climate change 
adaptation in Vietnam. In the summer of 2012, I travelled to Danang, Vietnam as an 
intern with UN-HABITAT. I spent two months, from late July to early September, 
2012 in Vietnam, attending climate change conferences and meetings and interning 
at UN-HABITAT’s Vietnam office to help them prepare for a climate change 
adaptation training and workshop with Ho Chi Minh City’s Department of Natural 
Resources and the Environment. The next summer in 2013, I worked as an intern 
with the Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, the leading international 
non-governmental organization (NGO) which has been leading climate change 
adaptation planning in Vietnamese cities, including Danang, Quy Nhon, Lao Cai, and 
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Can Tho. The lessons and experiences I gained as a participant and observer in these 
climate change/development spaces provided the foundation and shaped my 
research question.  
 
Overview  
The first chapter of this thesis reviews the impacts of both climate change 
and of economic development on urban areas in Vietnam. I look at the contradictory 
results emerging between economic development projects and climate adaptation 
goals by looking specifically at three important examples: road infrastructure, 
industrial zone development, and energy infrastructure. These three projects 
highlight the ways in which Vietnamese cities’ development and growth strategies 
directly contradict expressed climate adaptation goals.  
In the second chapter, I examine mainstream climate change adaptation 
planning, to understand the gaps in the planning process that allow development 
projects to move forward and undermine a city’s resilience to climate change. Some 
of these forces are related to Vietnam’s specific planning processes, while others are 
more inherent to the economic model which Vietnam has embraced. The current 
literature on climate change adaptation planning in Vietnam primarily focuses on 
process-related problems and makes recommendations for how to improve 
planning, public outreach, and implementation to avoid the worst outcomes. 
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However, there is currently very little literature exploring the inherent 
contradictions between economic growth imperatives and climate adaptation.  
In the third chapter, I explore what my interviewees generally described as 
some of the factors leading to these maladaptive projects. They highlighted various 
planning and governance challenges, however, none of the respondents challenged 
the underlying economic growth model which drives much of the urban and 
infrastructure development. The central argument of this thesis is that a city’s and 
country’s economic development model must be included and critiqued in any 
analysis of climate adaptation strategies.  
The fourth chapter of this paper explores the economic forces that shape 
Vietnamese urban development and the ways in which Vietnamese urban 
governance and planning also shapes development choices, and thus, urban 
development outcomes.  Currently described as a “market-based mixed economy,” 
Vietnam’s economy combines elements of state planning with liberalized market 
reforms to integrate into the global economy. The liberalization of Vietnam’s 
economy has important implications for its economic development strategy.  I look 
at how the financing of these projects reveal the external constraints of 
international finance that limit Vietnam’s autonomy. This section explores the 
resulting tensions and contradictions between local climate adaptation and 
economic growth strategies.  
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The fifth chapter critically examines the mainstream climate change 
adaptation approach, with its focus on improving planning processes, while ignoring 
the larger political choices and economic development models which are assumed 
yet not raised in the climate adaptation literature. I argue that Vietnam is stuck 
between the proverbial rock and a hot and hard place because its model of export-
led, growth-oriented development is requiring the country to develop infrastructure 
which is at odds with the necessary steps Vietnamese cities need to take to build 
their climate resilience. The sixth and final chapter of this thesis explores some core 
concepts of a more genuine and effective climate resilience strategy for Vietnamese 
cities.
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Literature Review 
My thesis is based on the theoretical gap that I see in the mainstream climate 
change adaptation literature. I draw heavily from the theories within urban 
geography and critical theory to understand the ways in which a deeper 
understanding of the political economy of Vietnam can explain the failures of urban 
development to build climate resilience in Vietnam. Ultimately, building a more 
effective climate change adaptation planning framework entails confronting the 
political and economic forces which are creating both inequality and environmental 
destruction.  
To begin with, climate policy and planning is generally divided into two main 
categories: 1) climate change mitigation, which is any action that reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions which are causing climate change and 2) climate change 
adaptation, which is defined as “preparing for, and adjusting proactively to, 
projected climate change impacts, both negative impacts, as well as potential 
opportunities (World Bank 2011). In general, climate change mitigation strategies 
have focused on advanced industrialized countries, which are responsible for the 
bulk of historical emissions.  Yet the already-increasing impacts of climate change, 
particularly in the Global South, is lifting up the crucial importance of preparing for 
adapting to the climate change impacts, which are inevitable, given historical 
emissions.  
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Climate change adaptation is described as a diverse set of formal and 
informal actions and policies which local areas can adopt in order to prepare for 
coming climate-related changes of sea-level rise, stronger and more frequent 
storms, changes in rainfall patterns, higher temperatures, and increased flooding. 
Climate change adaptation, then, is a broad umbrella term encompassing everything 
from building ‘hard’ infrastructure such as sea dykes and improved weather 
forecasting systems, to investing in ‘soft’ infrastructure such as educating farms 
about diversifying crops or strengthening disaster-preparedness education.   
Climate change adaptation planning literature borrows heavily from disaster 
risk reduction literature, with a particularly strong emphasis on understanding 
specific climate risks that a city faces (Moench et al., 2011a). Thus, scientific models 
and projections of climate impacts, as well as the data necessary to make those 
models---are highly valued and centered in the adaptation literature, as the 
foundation for climate adaptation planning.  Urban climate adaptation plans tend to 
focus on the specific climate change impacts, such as extreme heat or flooding, and 
to propose specific measures that a city, state, nation, or community can take 
(Tanner et al., 2009). In a recent report on “Catalyzing Urban Resilience” the non-
profit Institute for Social and Environmental Transition (ISET) writes, “the framing 
of climate change adaptation in relationship to specific climate change impacts 
perpetuates the ‘predict and prevent’ paradigm that has traditionally underpinned 
geo-hazard engineering. Hence, current approaches to urban climate adaptation 
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have a tendency to focus on technical responses to particular climate hazards, such 
as defensive coastal infrastructure or zoning coastal areas in response to sea level 
rise” (2017).  
To move beyond a narrow focus on specific climate impacts towards a more 
systems-based approach, many climate adaptation planners have embraced the 
concept of “climate resilience.” A resilient city is “characterized by its capacity to 
with and or absorb the impact of a [climate] hazard through resistance or 
adaptation, which enable it to maintain certain basic functions and structures 
during a crisis, and bounce back or recover from an event (Johnson and Blackburn, 
2014). Because building a community’s adaptive capacity is connected to building 
community resilience, I use the terms “resilience” and “adaptive capacity” 
interchangeably in this paper. Some key elements of resiliency draw from complex 
engineering and ecological systems, such as “safe failure” “redundancy” “flexibility” 
and “diversity.”  This engineering and ecological emphasis on “maintaining functions 
and structures” and “bouncing back” is ubiquitous throughout much adaptation and 
resilience literature (James et al., 2015; Moench et al., 2011b; Tanner et al., 2009), 
and thus highlights how much of both the climate adaptation and resilience field is 
founded on an assumption that returning to the original “status quo” is the goal.  
The growing body of climate change adaptation literature is draws heavily 
from planning and international development practices, with contributions from the 
fields of engineering and hazard risk reduction. Whether focusing on formal or 
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informal adaptation actions, the underlying framework of climate change adaptation 
literature in development focuses primarily on a technocratic policy and planning 
framework. Some authors focus on how to integrate climate science projections, as 
well as scientific uncertainty into decision-making on adaptation strategies (Tyler 
and Moench, 2012). Other written reports describe how to conduct climate 
vulnerability and adaptability assessments and how to create processes that engage 
the participation of multiple stakeholders (Moser and Ekstrom, 2011) and facilitate 
a process of prioritizing adaptation strategies from among a menu of options with 
differing costs, impacts, and benefits across different time scales.  
Problems identified in the climate change reports and presentations in 
Vietnam are frequently portrayed as primarily physical or managerial problems, 
such as flooding, or a lack of education about an issue, that can be solved through 
technical solutions, whether through building infrastructure or building the 
knowledge, skills, and capacity of local government or community members. In fact, 
however, even the most physical manifestations of climate change impacts are 
embedded within social relations of power that determine an individual’s sensitivity 
and capacity to adapt to any particular stressor.  
The supposedly apolitical narrative of many climate adaptation plans 
reinforces James Ferguson’s notion of development planning as an “anti-politics 
machine” (1994) in which development and climate adaptation projects are 
presented as self-standing entities, detached from any social relations of power.  
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Given the highly political and contested nature of many of the decisions that need to 
be made, it is notable that most climate adaptation literature presents fairly 
depoliticized, generalized frameworks and action steps without any discussion of 
the specific political and economic context (particularly the political and economic 
forces both globally and domestically) which inhibit effective adaptation.  
Measuring the success or failure of a climate adaptation strategy is 
complicated, since climate impacts may differ over time, and some groups may 
benefit from an intervention, while others are harmed. The climate adaptation 
literature defines those climate adaptation strategies that increase vulnerability as 
“maladaptation” (Adger et al., 2005). In an editorial about maladaptation, the Global 
Environmental Change defines five types of maladaptation. In their framework, 
maladaptive actions: 1)increase emissions of greenhouse  gases, 2) 
disproportionately burden the vulnerable, 3) have high opportunity costs (high 
economic, social, and environmental costs) comparted to alternative actions; 4) 
reduce incentives to adapt, or 5) commit capital and institutions to trajectories that 
are difficult to change (path dependency) (“Maladaptation,” 2010, 212). The ever-
present risk of maladaptation highlights the challenges of building climate resilience 
and adaptive capacity amidst many competing development priorities, primarily 
that of economic growth.  
In climate adaptation and resilience literature, the theoretical separation 
between climate change adaptation/resilience and economic development models is 
   
14 
clear. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by examining the ways in which 
economic development strategies must be an integral part of understanding urban 
climate resilience. This thesis examines the contradictions of climate change 
adaptation within a growth-oriented economic development agenda and to 
reimagine some key components of a comprehensive and critical framework for 
urban climate resilience.  
To understand the economic forces which are shaping Vietnam’s urban 
development, I draw on the literature of Marxian political economy and critical 
urban theory. Proponents of neoliberal ideology argue that “open, competitive, and 
unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the 
optimal mechanism for economic development" (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 
350).  Over the last few decades, Vietnam, has embraced global free market 
economic integration and an aggressive growth-first economic development 
strategy. Although climate change adaptation manuals generally present their 
recommendations as politically neutral, this thesis argues that the planning 
approaches suggested—and the questions about politics and economics that are left 
unasked—reinforce a neoliberal ideology that make it difficult for cities to address 
the forces that are driving and increasing climate vulnerability.  
Political economists such as David Harvey (1989) have noted that, due to a 
variety of factors, including internal crises of capitalism, investors from the Global 
North have increasingly looked, since the 1970s, to developing countries in Asia and 
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other parts of the Global South for investment opportunities. At the same time, the 
failures of agricultural collectivization and centralized state planning in the post-
war era of 1975-1985 led the Vietnamese government to begin to dismantle many 
agricultural and other collectives, institute some modified property rights, and 
embrace a more market-oriented approach to economic development. In order to 
join the World Trade Organization in 1997, Vietnam began to reform its state-
owned enterprises, increase private investments in state-owned industries, and take 
away tariffs and other policies designed to protect Vietnam’s domestic industries . 
Vietnam’s accession into WTO and entry into global markets has led to a rapid 
growth in exports and economic growth, reinforcing a growth-first development 
strategy that depends on continuing to attract foreign investment, through the 
creation of supportive legal and tax structures.  
Harvey’s concepts of urban entrepreneurialism and inter-urban competition 
describe the ways in which cities must increasingly compete against one another, 
both within Vietnam and around the world, to attract investments and hold capital 
to a particular locale. The concept of urban entrepreneurialism explains the 
evolution of urban governance in Vietnam from a more managerial approach in the 
pre-1986 era, mostly concerned with the provision of public services to a more 
active, risk-bearing approach today to spur economic development (Harvey 1989). 
Vietnam’s one-party state control creates a unique aspects to a form of 
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“authoritarian neoliberalism,” but Vietnamese cities are subject to the same global 
competition to attract and hold capital investment.  
The need to attract investment and maintain economic growth influences 
Vietnamese local and national government choices in what kinds of infrastructure 
projects they choose to build.  Jason Hackworth in The Neoliberal City (2006) 
examines local municipal financing to highlight how local governments are severely 
constrained by their dependence on finance capital to fund their basic infrastructure 
and how bond rating agencies, despite their supposedly neutral position, enforce 
deeply ideological fiscal practices on urban governments that seeking the low 
interest rates which are linked to good bond ratings. In the case of Vietnam, global 
financial institutions enforce a similar fiscal discipline that profoundly shapes 
Vietnam’s development and infrastructure choices (Hildyard, 2014). A deeper 
understanding of how export-oriented growth shapes Vietnamese city development 
can help explain why cities act in contradiction to the mandates of climate change 
adaptation and the government’s professed goals of poverty reduction.  
  
   
17 
 
Chapter 2:  Contradictions Between Urban Infrastructure Development 
and Building Climate Resil ience in Vietnam  
Urban Development Context in Vietnam:  
Vietnam’s urban areas have undergone a massive transformation over the 
last 30 years. In 1990, the percentage of people living in urban areas was between 
less than 18%. By 2016, the urbanized population had grown to 34% of the general 
population (World Bank, 2016). Rapid urbanization has outpaced the government’s 
ability to provide adequate housing and transportation infrastructure, as is 
demonstrated by the congested streets, rising rents, and lack of affordable housing. 
A growth-first approach for economic development strategies in Vietnam has led to 
rapid and severe environmental degradation, including air pollution, water 
pollution, and toxic pollution of soil and freshwater sources.  
Rapid urbanization has stretched the capacity of the government to provide 
adequate urban infrastructure to provide for its growing urban population. Vietnam 
has done “a remarkable job in achieving nearly universal coverage (i.e. 96%) in 
access to electricity” (World Bank Urban Brief, April 2012). Other basic urban 
services, such as water and sanitation, housing, and transportation, however, lag 
behind, creating a host of health and safety problems for urban residents. The Asian 
Development Bank (2010) reports that as of 2008, only 10 percent of municipal 
wastewater was treated, and in 2010, only 45% of industrial zones were expected to 
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have wastewater treatment of some kind. Inadequate water supply, drainage, and 
wastewater systems represent a serious public health and environmental hazard 
and the Vietnamese government has leveraged funding to build over eight 
wastewater treatment plants in Hanoi and 30 wastewater treatment plants in the 
Mekong Delta (Viet Nam News June 2012).  
The impacts of insufficient wastewater collection and treatment are 
exacerbated by the frequent floods that occur in Vietnam’s cities. In October 2008, 
for example, Hanoi experienced five days of steady rainfall, which led to the worst 
flood in Hanoi in thirty years (World Bank Urban Brief, 2012). Houses and streets 
were submerged, and residents were unable to leave their houses. During this time, 
schools were closed for several days, and people were unable to reach the hospital 
without a boat. During the flood, the risk of disease outbreaks increased, 
demonstrating the severe public health threat posed by the failing sanitation 
system.  
 Amidst these significant urban development challenges, Vietnamese cities 
are also facing significant climate change-related impacts. For Vietnamese cities, the 
most commonly discussed impacts of climate change relate to increased flooding of 
streets and homes, extreme heat events, destructive typhoons, and vector-borne 
diseases. Sea level rise and global mean temperature rises are predicted to increase 
the severity of flooding and typhoons, droughts, and saltwater intrusion (Chaudhry, 
and Ruysschaert, 2007; McElwee, 2010). The IPCC reports that by 2050, sea level 
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rise, saltwater intrusion, and flooding could affect up to 7 of the 18 million people 
living along the Mekong delta in Vietnam (Brown, 2014). Within this century, 
increasing droughts, heat waves, floods, and typhoons threaten to devastate 
people’s livelihoods and force millions of Vietnamese to migrate. Although the 
Vietnamese government has publicly recognized these threats and embarked on a 
climate adaptation strategy over ten years ago, Vietnamese cities’ development 
plans and economic strategies often undermine and contradict their climate 
adaptation goals.  
The National Strategy on Climate Change from 2011, mandates that all cities 
develop climate change adaptation plans, conduct climate change risk assessments 
and integrate those climate risk assessments into local urban development planning 
(Tyler 2017). Yet despite the many national and local climate change adaptation 
plans in Vietnam, critical estuarine, wetland, and floodplain areas are still being 
destroyed to make room for rapid urban growth and industrial development. 
Transportation infrastructure, industrial zone development, and energy 
infrastructure are high priorities for the Vietnamese government. In my interviews 
with Vietnamese government officials and planners, the construction of roads, 
highways, housing developments, and industrial zones are seen as essential 
prerequisites for economic growth and represent key aspects of what it means to be 
a developed country (personal interviews, 2017).  
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Summary of Interview Findings 
In my interviews with Vietnamese government officials and planners, my 
interview subjects acknowledged the frequent contradictions between economic 
development and climate adaptation strategies. Although they agreed that economic 
development is generally prioritized, my interview subjects also had a good 
understanding of how high temperature extremes, flooding, and other climate 
impacts would detrimentally impact city residents. They described numerous 
examples of urban development projects that directly contradict a city’s climate 
adaptation goals—from residential and industrial developments that were built on 
floodplains to industrial parks that destroyed former mangrove forests.  
 To explain why these maladaptive projects were implemented, planners 
generally came up with four general explanations. First, some explained that 
government planners often lack an understanding of localized climate change 
impacts. Secondly, they argued that many government bureaus and ministries had a 
faulty planning culture—citing a lack of coordination and the tendency to work in 
siloes as a key explanation for why projects would contradict the very climate 
resilience goals espoused by the city and country. Thirdly, many NGO workers talked 
about how the Vietnamese government planners and officials often fail to consult 
local communities who are most impacted by the projects, which thus leads to 
outcomes that increase vulnerability, particularly among poor and marginalized 
communities. Lastly, my interview subjects lifted up the lack of government 
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accountability, widespread corruption, lack of transparency, as key governance 
issues that lead to maladaptive development projects.  
 Although all of these explanations have merit, notably none of my participants 
articulated a larger systemic critique of the underlying economic growth model as a 
key factor leading to these maladaptive projects. Most of them decried the narrow 
focus on economic value over social and environmental values, as well as the 
prioritization of short-term profit over long-term value. Yet, most expressed a belief 
that a more comprehensive approach that balanced social equity, environmental 
protection, and economic development would enable development projects that built 
climate resilience while promoting economic development. In this thesis, I delve more 
deeply into the economic forces which are leading to the maladaptive outcomes.  
In this section, I look at three examples of urban and industrial development 
projects that directly contradict Vietnam’s climate change adaptation goals in order 
to understand the ways in which infrastructure development and residential 
development practices can undermine climate resilience and make residents more 
vulnerable to the severe climate. The purpose of this section is not necessarily to 
delve into the technical details of each project, or to highlight the particular areas of 
improvement, but rather to give a snapshot view of the ways in which common 
urban development projects are frequently at odds with climate change adaptation 
goals. This thesis explores how the underlying economic paradigm of these projects 
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lead inevitably to contradictory outcomes for cities attempting to both grow their 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as well as build climate resilience.  
Industrial Zone construction: Thai Binh Economic Zone 
Industrial zones are a key component of export-led development, since they 
facilitate foreign direct investment. Local city governments compete for investment 
by building industrial parks or zones that bring together needed infrastructure, such 
as water and wastewater treatment, access to electricity, easy transport to shipping 
centers, and a steady pool of labor.  Many industrial parks are purposefully sited 
near major roads that lead to airports, seaports, and rail stations for convenient 
shipping.  The Vietnamese government usually establishes financial incentives, such 
as reduced tax rates or other subsidies to encourage companies to choose their 
cities as locations to invest.  
The northern province of Thai Binh lies about 110 km from Hanoi. As a 
coastal province, it faces recurring storms and typhoons that are projected to grow 
increasingly destructive as global temperatures rise. Starting in the mid-1980s, local 
villagers and the provincial government embarked on planting and restoring the 
coastal mangrove forests after a heavy storm in 1986 swept in powerful tides, 
destroyed the dike and flooded the village (Binh 2017). “The forest has since 
become a golden shield for thousands of households against storms,” a local 
resident told Tuoi Tre newspaper (2017).  
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Recently, however, 320 hectares of the mangrove forests are slated to be 
destroyed to make way for a new industrial zone. On January 3, 2018, the Prime 
Minister announced the establishment of a new Thai Binh Economic Zone, which 
will cover 31,000 hectares. Like other economic zones in Vietnam, the TBEZ will 
offer tax breaks, subsidies, and other economic incentives to attract companies to 
locate within the zone (Nhan Dan 2018). Nationally, a preferential corporate income 
tax rate of 10% has been set for a 15-year period for new investments in economic 
and high-tech zones. 
Given that mangrove forests protect against climate change impacts such as 
rising sea levels, and more intense storms typhoons, the destruction of these 
mangrove forests to build industrial zones obviously undermines Thai Binh coastal 
village’s climate resilience. As recently as 2016, Thai Binh province renewed its 
commitment to planting 1,320 more hectares of mangrove forest in recognition of 
the important role that the forest plays in supporting people’s agricultural, seafood, 
and aquaculture livelihoods. In February of 2017, the Minister of the Environment 
visited Thai Binh province in celebration of World Wetlands Day, and the entire 
320-hectare plot of mangrove forest to be used for the industrial zone lies 
completely within the bounds of the Red River Biosphere Reserve (Tuoi Tre, 2017).  
Even the nominal environmental impact assessment, noted that clearing 
mangrove forests would “allow seawater to reach the mainland and destroy local 
dike systems and aquatic farms in the event of strong storms” (Tuoi Tre, 2017). The 
environmental impact assessment process itself was criticized for failing to 
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community members. Journalists noted that although the developer held two 
separate meetings for public feedback, only local leaders were invited, not 
community members who would be impacted the most, such as the 354 aquatic 
farming households and other residents whose livelihoods depend on having a 
strong protective mangrove forest (Tuoi Tre, 2017). Despite this absence of public 
participation, the industrial zone project was approved in January of 2018. The Thai 
Binh industrial zone project represents the contradictions between and within local 
and national government agencies, in seeking to both protect their mangrove forests 
and aquatic-based industries, while also expanding their industrial development 
and investments.  
 
Road Infrastructure: Danang and Quy Nhon 
Given the emphasis on attracting outside investment in industries, the 
Vietnamese government has also prioritized the expansion of its road infrastructure. 
According to the World Bank, less than half of the country’s roads are paved (World 
Bank’s Trading Economics website), and the Vietnamese government estimates that 
the cost of building the necessary highways to connect industrial and manufacturing 
hubs to ports and other cities ranges in the billions of dollars (Lam, 2017). 
With a population of 1.4 million, Danang is the third largest city in Vietnam, 
located in central Vietnam. It is one of only five cities in Vietnam with a Level 1 
ranking, meaning that its city government has more autonomy and is not under the 
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authority of a higher-level provincial government (Tran et al., 2017).  Rapid urban 
growth in Danang has led to new development in the southernmost areas of the city, 
such as Hoa Tien commune (Singh et al., 2015). In order to serve the newly 
urbanized areas of the city, the city of Danang built a new road through Hoa Tien 
commune, with primary funding provided by the Asian Development Bank (Tran et 
al., 2017). Called the “ADB5 Road” by local residents, the road was built 2.5 meters 
higher than surrounding areas. Although elevated road construction above seasonal 
flood levels might be seen as a precautionary climate adaptation strategy, these 
actions also bring unintended consequences for surrounding areas. A study by the 
Institute for Social and Environmental Transition found that expanded road 
construction, residential developments, industrial zones, and even wastewater 
treatment plans are filling in floodplain areas and exacerbating flooding.  The report 
authors write “The construction of ring roads to service the city has added to 
existing hazards by obstructing the water’s natural pathways and directing it to the 
new residential area and beyond, causing harsher flooding in neighboring wards” 
(Singh et al., 2015). 
 As demand for developable land grows, the city of Danang is trucking in soil 
from nearby mountains to fill in floodplains for development of residential, 
commercial, and industrial projects. These new developments, like the new roads, 
are usually built at a higher elevation to prevent the flooding, but in trying to protect 
some residents, others who live outside the protected areas have to suffer from 
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higher flood waters.  
In the city of Quy Nhon, ISET researchers Michael DiGregorio and Van Cao 
Huynh (2012) studied the extreme flooding that occurred after Typhoon Mirinae in 
2009, which killed 22 people. The researchers noted that although the rainfall in 
Quy Nhon was not particularly heavy, the new highway construction, as well as new 
industrial and residential infill projects had transformed the floodplain area, 
blocking the flow of water into the Thi Nai Lagoon, which serves as the outlet for the 
many upstream rivers and streams that flow through Quy Nhon. In their study, they 
found that while climate change is projected to change precipitation levels, in fact 
recent urban development played a much larger role in creating the extreme, and in 
this case fatal, flooding. Digregorio and Huynh note that in the period after 
liberation in 1975, the water management system accommodated the natural cycles 
of flooding and tides, recognizing the value that floods played in supporting the 
then-agricultural area. However, this water management system changed as the 
area became increasingly urbanized in the late 1990s.  “From an urban perspective, 
flooding is a risk associated with the destruction of economic value measured in 
property, labor, and financial capital,” they explain. “Unlike farmers, who perceive 
benefits in normal seasonal flooding, urban property owners see only threats” 
(DiGregorio and Huynh, 2012). Urban construction and road development, often 
prioritize the needs of urban projects over the needs of agricultural farmers.  
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The new master plans for Quy Nhon include construction of dikes for flood 
protection, yet dikes cannot prevent flooding--they can only serve by displacing 
flooding to other areas. Thus, the researchers posit that the incremental expansion 
of flood prevention infrastructure—from elevated roads to dikes —will ultimately 
undermine the expressed goal. Digregorio and Huynh predict: 
If the master plans and project plans for Quy Nhon are carried out, the 
next flood is likely to result in new calls for flood prevention 
infrastructure in Dieu Tri, Tuy Phuoc, southern Nhon Phu, Tran Quang 
Dieu, and Phuoc My. In this way, the incremental process will continue 
upstream until the entire lower and middle levels of the river are 
diked. Eventually, the floodways will be so constrained that the 
protective dike system itself will be overcome (2012). 
 
As demonstrated in these road infrastructure examples from both Danang and Quy 
Nhon, flooding is not merely some biophysical force to be modeled and planned for. 
Rather, flooding interacts with the changing human-built environment, which is 
shaped by political priorities and power relations.  
Energy Infrastructure: Long Phu 1 Coal-Fired Power Plant  
In the less than thirty years, Vietnam has moved from being one of the 
poorest countries in the world in the 1991 to being a middle-income country today. 
Vietnam’s investments in its energy infrastructure have played a key role in 
supporting its rapid economic development. As the Vietnam Energy Outlook Report 
2017 declares, “Economic growth requires secure and affordable supply of energy 
to all of the society participants and economic sectors.” The Vietnamese rapid 
expansion of energy infrastructure in Vietnam has yielded impressive results. In 
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1998, only half of Vietnam had access to electricity, while today almost the entire 
country has access to electricity, which has laid the foundation for Vietnam’s 
emergence as new manufacturing hub in Asia (Lam, 2017).  
With new factories opening up and rising consumer spending on a multitude 
of electrical appliances, Vietnam’s electrical demand is growing 11% every year, 
about double the annual GDP growth rate (Williams, 2017). To meet skyrocketing 
energy demand, Vietnam is increasingly turning to coal. From 2000 to 2015, the 
share of renewable energy, mostly hydropower and biomass energy, dropped from 
over half (53%) to less than a quarter (24%) of total energy supply (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2017). During this same period, the coal usage grew from 15% to 35% of 
total supply. It is projected that by 2020, coal will replace hydropower as the main 
source of electricity generation, and that by 2030, coal-fired plants will generate 
more than half of the country’s total electricity (V. P. Nguyen, 2017). 
 Vietnam’s dependence on coal is already harming its citizens’ health, and is 
projected to lead to almost 20,000 excess deaths per year by 2030 due to air 
pollution, a fivefold increase from the calculated number in 2011 (4,252 deaths).  By 
2030, Vietnam will be the country most affected by coal pollution in all of Southeast 
Asia, with 188.8 excess deaths per million people (Nguyen, 2017). For comparison, 
the calculated number for the second most affected country in the Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia, is 85.4 excess deaths per million people. Traffic accidents, the number 
one cause of unnatural deaths in Vietnam today, cause about 106 excess deaths per 
million people from 2012-2017. Despite these stark statistics and growing protests 
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from the citizens who are suffering from coal pollution, economic planners feel that 
Vietnam has few choices, if it wants to continue its growth-oriented development 
path.  
Long Phu 1 is the first of three coal-fired power stations planned as part of 
the Long Phu Power Center, located in Soc Trang province in the Mekong River 
Delta, about 230 km outside of Ho Chi Minh City. Financed by a variety of public and 
private financial institutions, including various export credit agencies in Europe, as 
well as the Russian development bank Vnesheconombank, the coal plant is expected 
to cost about $1.9 billion (Market Forces website, 2018). Once completed, Long Phu 
1 will burn imported coal for Australia and Indonesia and is projected to generate 
1200 MW of energy and 5.4 million tons of carbon dioxide a year (DeAngelis, 2018).  
International environmental organizations and advocacy groups argue that 
the environmental impact assessment underreports carbon emissions, and that 
even the false emissions reports violate standards set forth by the OECD for coal 
financing by export credit agencies, which are the largest source of public financing 
for coal plants (Ives, 2018). Likewise, private financial institutions, including 
Citibank, UK Export Finance, and Wells Fargo, have agreed to the Equator Principles 
which similarly set forth guidelines to ensure that large development and 
infrastructure projects consider environmental and social impacts in the process of 
funding approval (Tatarski, 2018). In its June 2017 report “Failure to Comply,” 
Friends of the Earth International reported how the Long Phu 1 violates both the 
OECD standards and the Equator Principles that most of the public and private 
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banks have adopted with respect to financing coal projects. First, they note that 
despite claims by the project developers, the plant uses a dirtier “supercritical” 
technology and not “ultra-supercritical” technology1.  Secondly, they note that the 
environmental and social impact statements were faulty. Thirdly, the project 
sponsors “will not be able to demonstrate that less carbon intensive alternatives are 
not possible,” which is part of the OECD guidelines. And lastly, they note that the 
project is in direct contradiction to Vietnam’s national energy policy, which states an 
explicit goal of expanding renewable energy infrastructure and investments 
(DeAngelis 2018).  
In addition to the long-term climate impacts from coal plant emissions, many 
Vietnamese citizens are starting to voice their opposition to the air pollution and 
resulting health ailments that these coal-fired power plants bring to surrounding 
communities. In April 2015, thousands of residents of the southeastern village of 
Vinh Tan in Binh Thuan province gathered to block National Highway 1 for 30 hours 
after dust from the nearby Vinh Tan coal power plant covered their homes. The coal 
ash hit around 1,370 households in the Vinh Tan commune and many residents of 
Vinh Tan reported developing respiratory diseases since coal plant came into 
operation (Nam, 2015). Nationwide, coal-fired power plants use about 20 million 
                                                                 
1 Super-critical technology, with a thermal efficiency of around 42%, is more efficient than 
subcritical coal technology, which has a thermal efficiency of around 38%. Ultra-supercritical 
technology has a 44-47% thermal efficiency. Ultra-supercritical technology is associated with 
14% lower sulphur dioxide and other emissions than sub-critical technology. (Mylliyvirta, 2017) 
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tons of coal per year and discharge about three million tons of coal ash, the disposal 
of which has created further toxic pollution in land and waterways (Nam, 2015).  
The Long Phu 1 coal-fired power plant project exemplifies the glaring 
contradictions between Vietnam’s stated Paris Climate Accord goals, and its 
economic development goals.  
Upon hearing that Vietnam had confirmed plans to build another 40 gigawatts 
worth of coal-fired power plants, the equivalent of about 40 nuclear power plants, 
World Bank president Jim Yong Kim told a group of world leaders in unscripted 
remarks that “If Vietnam goes forward with 40GW of coal, if the entire region 
implements the coal-based plans right now, I think we are finished. That would spell 
disaster for us and our planet.” (Goldenberg 2016).  
Although it was perhaps a surprise to the Vietnamese government to learn 
that their energy choices have such an impact on global climate change, Kim’s 
assertion is corroborated by climate scientists who have essentially said that coal 
power needs to be quickly phased out by 2050, if the world is to meet its agreed goal 
of keeping global warming to less than 2ºC, which is a politically-determined 
threshold in which climate change impacts which are perceived as “dangerous” and 
the potential for runaway climate change through positive feedback loops increases 
(Plumer 2014).  Since coal-fired power plants can take up to a decade to build, 
Vietnam’s plans to build Long Phu 1 and to add about 40 Gigawatts of coal-fired 
power by 2030 will definitively lock Vietnam into dirty coal power generation well 
past 2050, the date at which scientists have said that coal use must have ceased to 
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avoid more than a one-meter sea level rise, which would force millions of 
Vietnamese to migrate from parts of the Mekong River Delta and other low-lying 
coastal regions (Brown, 2014).  
Yet nowhere in Vietnam’s many climate adaptation plans, is the halting of 
coal-fired power plants mentioned. Climate adaptation literature considers actions 
that reduce greenhouse gases to be “climate mitigation” which is a separate 
category of planning and action. This false separation between climate adaptation 
and climate mitigation strategies allows and contributes to contradictory energy 
development plans and climate change adaptation plans that are at odds with one 
another.  
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Chapter 3:  Interviewees’ Four Main Explanations  for Maladaptation  
 
My interviewees offered four general categories of explanations for why 
cities are failing to properly build adaptive capacity, in spite of their climate 
adaptation plans and goals.  
1) Lack of information about climate change  
The first could be broadly called the “lack of information” theory, in which 
many planners believe that city officials lack accurate climate data about climate 
impacts at the local scale. In addition, To begin with, my interviewees explained, 
some local government officials do not fully understand how climate change will 
impact or is already impacting their particular community (personal interviews, 
2017). Indeed, my interviews did reveal some lack of understanding of climate 
impacts. Several officials in Hanoi, where many of my interviews took place, argued 
that climate change impacts were less clear in Northern Vietnam, because Northern 
Vietnamese cities didn’t have the same geography as the low-lying Mekong River 
Delta, nor did it suffer from as many typhoons as Central Vietnam. I heard this 
assessment several times, and does reflect a common misunderstanding that the 
impacts of climate change are limited to the biophysical impacts of climate change 
that occur within the boundaries of a particular city or province or country. This 
misunderstanding does reflect a lack of information about how climate change can 
trigger impacts on industrial and agricultural supply chains and human migration 
patterns that reach far beyond the borders of a particular city.   
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In addition, people pointed to lack of resources to gather accurate localized 
information. For example, planners at the Department of Natural Resources and 
Environment in Ho Chi Minh City pointed out the need to “invest in upgrading the 
water quality monitoring system” as a key adaptation priority, which would allow 
them to make more informed decisions about saline water intrusion and water 
pollution (UN-HABITAT, 2012). The ranges of uncertainty which are inherent to 
projections of increased rainfall or temperatures also made it difficult for planners 
to incorporate climate projections into their plans. In this first causal explanation, 
the problem can be solved through prioritizing education and capacity-building to 
help planners deal with uncertainty and develop more robust plans that can adapt 
to a range of climate scenarios. Many foundations and development agencies have 
prioritized this kind of education and capacity-building, as well as investing in 
better climate data collection and monitoring systems and more effectively 
disseminating climate data to planners (Nguyen et al., 2014). And the relative lack of 
financial resources can be solved by increased investment by donor and financial 
institutions, which can in turn be used to support necessary investments in both 
hard infrastructure, and in governmental capacity-building.  
2) Uncoordinated planning processes 
 My interview participants also offered a second general theory for 
maladaptive development projects which focused on uncoordinated planning 
processes, including lack of communication and coordination between cities and 
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agencies. For example, they described instances in which the Department of 
Construction or the Department of Transport, for example, approves development 
and construction on an area that has been mapped by the Department of Natural 
Resources and Environment to be a floodplain. Likewise, many climate change 
impacts, such as flooding are exacerbated by the lack of regional coordination 
between provinces. For example, hydropower dams upstream may be controlled by 
different agencies and be in a different jurisdiction than the downstream towns and 
cities which experience the impacts from the water flows. Hydropower authorities 
have an economic incentive to operate at full capacity, which makes it challenging 
for them to reduce reservoir levels when rainfall is uncertain (Tran and Tran, 2015). 
Thus, when unexpected heavy rainfall occurs, the dam operators often are forced to 
release large amounts of water at exactly the time when downstream areas are 
already experiencing flooding due to heavy rains. The construction of new 
residential, commercial and industrial developments inevitably leads to impacts 
elsewhere, as floodplain areas filled and water is redirected to lower-lying areas.  
 To address this uncoordinated development, climate adaptation 
practitioners recommend: more coordination between cities, the development of 
regional plans so cities can coordinate with other cities, and mechanisms for 
integrating flood and drainage information into various construction and 
development plans (Moench et al., 2011a; Tran and Tran, 2015). In 2017, the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment an integrated inter-sectoral 
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planning law, which was adopted by the National Assembly in November of 2017 
(Nhan Dan, 2017). However, one of my interviewees cautioned: 
If the National Assembly approves this law, it is a good step, but 
implementing it will be challenging. The Ministry of Construction and 
other ministries seem to not want the plan, because they may lose 
their funding, with their own budget, and control over their plan. 
(personal interview, 2017).  
As his comment highlights, mandating increased coordination does not mean that 
the departments and ministries will change their practices, given their own self-
interests. Increased coordination requires training and the development of new 
processes to enable city departments and jurisdictions to coordinate and implement 
plans. Regional coordination along bioregions and watershed regions, requires the 
creation of new institutional structures such as river basin management 
organizations, which cross existing jurisdictional boundaries, and may threaten 
existing spheres of power, funding, and decision-making.  
3) Lack of public consultation and participation  
  Vietnam’s Constitution and political culture prioritizes public participation 
in decision-making. Two familiar slogans in Vietnam that reflect this participatory 
emphasis are: “People know, people discuss, people do, and people monitor” and 
“Government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Nguyen, 2009).  
Vietnam has a wide array of mass organizations which serve to facilitate public 
involvement in civic life, such as the Vietnam Women’s Union, the Farmers’ Union, 
the Youth Union, and trade unions.  Participation in mass organizations does not, 
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however, mean that people are regularly engaged in land use and development 
decisions (Wells-Dang et al., 2015). My interview participants acknowledged that 
the top-down planning culture in Vietnam leads to development projects that 
frequently do not engage the communities most impacted, and that thus frequently 
increase certain communities’ vulnerability. For example, Toan Vu, a Technical 
Consultant with ISET explains: 
Finding successful climate change adaptation examples is not easy. Vietnam 
has invested a lot of money in climate adaptation projects, for example, the 
mangrove projects. But if you don’t involve local people in the project, even if 
it creates 10-100 hectares of mangrove, if you don’t engage people and 
address their livelihoods, it’s not successful.  (personal interview, 2017) 
Vu described one project in Thanh Hoa province in which the government engaged 
“experts on mangrove plantations,” without the participation and decision-making 
of the poor fisherpeople and shrimp farmers living along the coast. Because they did 
not involve the local residents, the planners failed to consider how residents would 
generate income during the early years of the mangrove plantation development. 
Furthermore, because the local residents were not involved in the project, the 
organizers were not able to effectively engage them in maintaining the mangrove 
forests after they were planted (personal interview, 2017). 
 All three of the infrastructure examples that I highlighted earlier, including 
the Thai Binh industrial zone project, the Danang and Quy Nhon road and highway 
projects, and the Long Phu 1 coal-fired power plant projects, were critiqued for the 
lack of public consultation in the decision-making process. For example, in the case 
of Can Tho city, a researcher from the Vietnam-Japan University explained that 
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government planners can frequently circumvent requirements for public 
consultation by purposefully not engaging the proper stakeholders.  “For example, if 
Can Tho [city] wants to sell the land and rezone it, they will have the public meeting 
required, but they will invite the wrong person to come,” he explained in his 
interview. Likewise although Vietnam does require environmental impact 
assessments, my research revealed that interviewees generally did not believe that, 
in the face of extreme pressure, many planners carried out environmental impact 
assessments that were not rigorous or accurate.  
4) Governance issues: Accountability and corruption  
 Lastly, my interviewees pointed to government corruption and a lack of 
accountability as another key factor in driving maladaptive and harmful 
development projects. As a one-party state, Vietnam has an executive, legislative, 
and judiciary branch controlled by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Mass 
organizations such as the Women’s Union, Youth Union, and the General 
Confederation of Labor, are tightly connected to the government and the party 
(Thayer, 2008). In the post-Doi Moi period, the government has attempted to 
strengthen its electoral processes, but its elections are still carefully controlled 
(Thayer, 2008).  According to several interviewees, local leaders are frequently 
more concerned with impressing their superiors who appointed them, rather than 
to the local residents whom they ostensibly lead (personal interview, 2017). 
Moreover, the five-year cycle of leadership encourages a short-term focus, since 
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leaders are frequently appointed to new positions every five years. One NGO 
workers explained:  
Each official has four to five years, and they want to have some big 
projects during their mandate. It’s the thing people will look at to 
evaluate. “I did three or four big projects.” Usually the impacts come 
later. But their higher ranking bosses, look at it as an indicator that 
someone is doing a good job or bad job (personal interview, 2017). 
The appointments and relatively short terms of office create an incentive to produce 
immediate achievements within five years, even if the long-term costs of the project, 
particularly with respect to future climate change impacts, may be detrimental.  The 
lack of accountability to local constituents means that many communities have little 
voice in shaping the infrastructure development projects that directly affect their 
communities and livelihoods.   
 Many of my interviewees described a focus on short-term economic gain, 
even at the expense of long-term costs.  In contrast to the popular conception of 
government corruption as an individual gaining large amounts of money illegally, 
Nicholas Hildyard (2016) argues that there are many common practices, such as a 
revolving door between private industry and public office, which while not overtly 
illegal, do represent a corruption of the government’s ostensible purpose to protect 
the common good. A climate change researcher at Vietnam-Japan University points 
out that although the urban design and planning process is frequently carried out by 
consultants working with the provincial government. “Most of the planners are on 
the side of the private sector,” he explains. “They just want to buy land and sell the 
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house—they don’t care about the temperature increase, sea level rise, or flooding. 
They just want to know how much money they can get, and once they get money, 
they can move on” (personal interview, 2017). In the interview, he described how 
the private sector companies were driving the planning and development of cities, 
often in direct contradiction to the cities’ master plans. His responses suggest that 
the local government’s deference to capital and relative lack of capacity renders 
local planners unable to effectively regulate urban development.   
Although there is truth to all of these theories with regard to the lack of 
information and various failures and challenges of the planning process and lack of 
accountability, in this paper I propose a different explanation. I argue that in fact, 
the recurring maladaptive actions and projects are inherent in the economic 
development model that Vietnam has chosen, and that even with more information, 
better coordination, more participatory planning processes, and even more 
democratic governance, the inevitable contradictions between growth-oriented 
economic development and climate resilience would still be happening. By focusing 
so narrowly on better climate hazard and risk information and stronger planning 
processes, climate change adaptation scholars and practitioners tacitly suggest, 
through omission, rather than overt declaration, that climate change adaptation can 
be tackled without challenging power relations or the existing economic system and 
development model. In the next section, I explore the ways in which the political 
economy of Vietnam—from its economic development strategies, dependency on 
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international finance, and structural reforms—shape climate change resilience 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 4:  Political Economy of Vietnam: From Plan to Market  
 
In order to understand why urban development is going in opposite direction 
from climate adaptation plans, we need to understand the history, governance, and 
political economy of Vietnam, issues which are noticeably absent in climate 
adaptation literature. Over the past twenty years, Vietnam has engaged in a gradual 
transition from a socialist state-planned economy to a more market-oriented 
capitalist economy. For several decades during and after its wars for national 
independence (from 1950s-1986 in the North, and from 1975-1986 in the South), 
Vietnam was organized by a centralized state-planned economy. With agricultural 
collectivization, markets were abolished during this time, and a rationing system 
distributed food, cloth, and other essential items. This period of strict state planning 
and rationing is known as the Subsidy Period (thời bao cấp). The collectivization of 
agriculture, combined with a U.S. embargo, led to decreased agricultural production 
and widespread hunger (Pham, Trinh, and Nguyen 2007). Popular memory and 
discourse describes these years as a period of tremendous scarcity and hardship.  
In 1986, Vietnam, announced its Dỏi Mới (Renovation) policy, which 
announced a shift towards a more market-oriented economy. Subsequently, 
agricultural collectives were ended, and individual households were allowed to farm 
their own plots of land again, which turned Vietnam from a new importer to a net 
exporter of rice. The rationing system was abolished, and private businesses were 
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allowed. The market reforms, as well as the normalization of trade relations with 
the United States led to a period of impressive economic growth.  
Vietnam has explicitly chosen an export-led, foreign investment-dependent 
development model as a path out of poverty for its people. In many ways, this 
export-oriented growth model has been wildly successful. Over the past three 
decades, from the 1990s to the present, Vietnam transformed itself from one of the 
poorest countries in the world, to now a lower middle-income country. Vietnam’s 
economic growth rate ranged between 7-8% from 2003-2007, and now is hovering 
between 5 and 7% from 2008-2016, far outperforming most other countries. The 
poverty rate has fallen from an astounding 58% in 1993 to 14.5% in 2010. (World 
Bank website, “Vietnam Overview”). In light of these impressive results, the World 
Bank has declared Vietnam “a development success story.” (World Bank website, 
“Vietnam Overview”). 
The World Bank notes that between 1993 and 2012 the average income of 
the bottom 40% in Vietnam grew at an annual rate of 9 percent. Although they 
praise this as “one of the highest rates of growth for the bottom 40% in the world,” 
they fail to mention the much larger rates of growth for middle and upper income 
Vietnamese, particularly the very wealthiest Vietnamese. Today, Vietnam’s 210 
super-rich earn more than enough in one year to lift 3.2 million people out of 
poverty and end extreme poverty in Vietnam (Oxfam 2017). This economic 
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inequality undermines the poverty reduction goals that the Vietnamese government 
has set.   
Vietnam is not unique in this growing inequality, which has grown in parallel 
with the liberalization of its economy.  Indeed, the transcendence of neoliberal 
ideology has led nation-states around the world to steadily, and often rapidly, move 
away from state regulation and intervention towards more international free 
market economies over the last 40 years. In Vietnam, however, the one-party rule by 
the Vietnamese Communist Party does lend unique attributes to its economic 
restructuring.  Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002) use the term “actually 
existing neoliberalism” to emphasize that neoliberal restructuring operates 
differently in each place, adapting the “pre-existing uses of space, institutional 
configurations, and constellations of sociopolitical power” (361). Vietnam’s decades-
long history of one-party state planning and governance has profoundly shaped the 
political and regulatory context in which its now market-led restructuring is taking 
place. As Vietnam has become increasingly integrated into the global economy over 
the last twenty-five years, its economy has likewise been transformed through 
neoliberal restructuring, including the privatization of parts of its state-owned 
enterprise sector, as well as the liberalization of its trade both within Vietnam and 
with other countries.  
Despite the economic changes and rapid integration into the global economy, 
Vietnam’s institutions, culture, and practices create a unique brand of neoliberalism, 
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which Bob Jessop (2002) would call “neostatism,” in which the state plays a more 
active interventionist role to promotes the integration of Vietnam into the capitalist 
global economy. Ultimately, there is no such country or place practicing what might 
be considered “true” or “pure” neoliberalism. The neoliberal project itself is rather a 
contradictory process, full of advances and regressions, new additions and 
adaptations to local political forces. Thus Peck and Tickell (2003) use the term 
“neoliberalisation” to convey that rather than a permanent condition, 
neoliberalization is a continuing and always-contested process between local 
institutions, agents of resistance, and institutional legacies. In Vietnam, the 1990s 
and early 2000s represented an early stage of neoliberalisation, which they call 
“Roll-back” neoliberalism. In this phase of reaction, the many facets that represent 
the older interventionist welfare state are significantly scaled back and attacked, 
both rhetorically and concretely. In this phase, public services are privatized, labor 
protections may be shifted to give capital more power, the financial sector is often 
deregulated, and taxes are often cut in the name of increasing economic growth. 
After the destruction of the Keynesian state, Peck and Tickell describe the next 
phase as a more proactive phase of “Rollout neoliberalism” in which involves the 
construction of new institutions and structures to consolidate the new neoliberal 
regime (2003 p 163). In Vietnam, the destruction of the socialist state does not 
necessarily entail the destruction of the Communist Party nor does it mean the end 
of one-party rule, but it does mean a fundamental transformation of the purpose of 
the Party and government apparatus. Rather than the prior socialist focus on the 
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provision of services and redistribution of wealth, the Communist Party under 
market liberalization instead focuses on creating new regulatory and policy 
frameworks that support and facilitate neoliberalized state forms and modes of 
governance, in which public services and assets are increasingly transferred to the 
private sector to manage and profit from. The state plays a leading role in economic 
and social restructuring, including public-private partnerships under state guidance, 
and a move towards regulated competition rather than overt state control. In this 
way, despite the continuing presence of the government agencies in urban 
development, Vietnam’s market-oriented reforms represent strategies that advance, 
rather than challenge, private profit-driven interests. In the next section, I explore 
the dominant narratives of economic development and progress which justify the 
growth-at-any cost development model.  
 
Storylines of Economic Development and “Catching Up”  
 An understanding of Vietnam’s dominant narrative of development is 
key to understanding how climate change adaptation is conceived and 
implemented in Vietnam. In several informal conversations, people 
referenced the idea that Vietnam is “x number of years behind” various 
developed countries like the US.  Therefore, the dominant storyline of 
Vietnam conceptualizes development as a linear progression with some 
countries “further behind” Vietnam and other countries “ahead of” Vietnam, 
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as in Japan, the US, and European countries. Increasing wealth, as measured 
by Gross Domestic Product, as wealth as outward signifiers of wealth, such as 
number of millionaires, also symbolized some sort of progress (personal 
interviews, 2017). For example, when asked about his vision of a developed 
Vietnam, one official from the Urban Development Management Division of 
the Ministry of Construction, replied:   
If we can develop like Thailand, or like Malaysia, within the next 50 
years, that would be my own vision. Vietnam should be another 
Malaysia in the next 40-50 years (personal interview, 2017). 
This linear conceptualization and version of history reinforces the belief that “there 
is no alternative” to integrating into the global free market, as former British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher once famously declared. Thus, the only question 
becomes how much should the government privatize and how quickly should be the 
pace of market reforms? It effectively dismisses any discussion about what kind of 
development needs to take place, since obviously in a linear progression, it’s only 
forward or backward. 
My interviews revealed a general sense of pride in how quickly Vietnam had 
moved into lower middle-income status. In general, economic trade liberalization 
and integration into the global economy was seen as part of a larger process of 
Vietnam joining an advanced global society. In fact, in many ways, I heard economic 
reforms consistently conflated with political reforms, implying that any actions that 
devolved power away from the one-party state, were in some way connected to 
   
48 
more liberal political reforms, such as increased freedom of speech or more 
democratic governance. Erik Harms describes a similar conflation of political and 
market-based freedoms in Luxury and Rubble: Civility and Dispossession in the New 
Saigon (2016): 
After many years of socialism, when all property was nationalized, 
this is why so many Vietnamese people consider the return of private 
property—officially understood as the right to transfer “land use 
rights”—as a stepping stone on the pathway to increased freedom. 
(Kindle location 5025 of 7048) 
 
This sense of globalization as a civilizing process and a sign of progress, was a 
recurring theme in conversations with both officials and ordinary people on the 
street.  
Overwhelmingly, my interviewees expressed great hope in Vietnam’s steady 
integration into the global economy. One of the top leaders at the Academy for the 
Construction of Cities, a training arm within the Ministry of Construction, which 
trains managers throughout the country, stated “The younger generation will study 
abroad and become global citizens. They’ll take the lessons and progress of the 
world, and create new ways of thinking” (personal interview, 2017).  In statements 
similar to this, I heard my interviewees express a hope that the younger generation 
in Vietnam, whose increasing ability to speak English, access the internet, and study 
abroad, would be able to help Vietnam “catch up” to many more “advanced” 
countries such as Korea or Japan.  
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In my interviews, the popular narrative about Vietnam’s economic 
development went something like this:  The years under a state-planned economy 
as years of tremendous suffering, hunger, and hardship, and generally agreed that 
the economic stagnation of the period indicated a fundamental flaw of a state-
planned economy. Forced to change course, in 1986, the Communist government 
announced the policy of Dỏi Mới, or Renovation, in which the government 
announced it would begin to reduce government controls and allow free markets to 
operate. The reform process was slow to start, but as the Vietnamese government 
has loosened controls and joined the global market economy, Vietnam has 
developed quickly, and people are much better off today. In this popular narrative, 
the destruction of coastal and wetland ecosystems, massive deforestation, urban 
sprawl, and loss of farmland and biodiversity, are regrettable, yet justifiable under 
the current master narrative that this is an unfortunate phase that Vietnam must 
pass through in order to ‘catch up’ with the rest of the world in terms of economic 
development.  
The globally hegemonic storyline of development as economic growth has a 
powerful influence on Vietnam’s own vision for its development. In its publicly 
stated strategic plans and goals, Vietnam has put forth ambitious urban 
development goals, influenced by the image of development from the models it sees 
in the Global North. For example, one presentation from the Ministry of 
Construction declares a government goal to reach 70% urbanization by 2050. The 
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reasoning, according to this presentation, is that this urbanization ratio would then 
make Vietnam’s ratio “equal to developed countries.” (Ministry of Construction 
presentation, 2011). The logic seems easy to understand: If Vietnam wants to aim to 
be a developed country, it should therefore aim to have an urban/rural population 
ratio that is similar to that of developed countries. This dominant narrative of 
Vietnam “catching up” with the rest of the developed world hugely shapes Vietnam’s 
approach to development and climate change adaptation. 
Jason Hackworth (2006) describes “the discursive naturalization of 
neoliberalism” in which “neoliberalism gets transformed from a political moment 
into something that is natural, democratically chosen, or completely predictable.” 
Currently, the dominant discourse in Vietnam also suggests that there is a general 
consensus that governments are less efficient and effective than the private sector. 
This discursive naturalization of neoliberalism is also assumed in climate change 
adaptation approaches by international financial and development institutions, and 
necessarily limits the range of policy options that are presented.  
The consistently high GDP growth rate within Vietnam over the past thirty 
years and the rapid reduction in poverty rates seem to be concrete evidence of the 
superiority of the market liberalization strategy. Indeed, the liberalization of the 
economy does seem to have unleashed tremendous entrepreneurial energy in 
Vietnam (Kim, 2008). After decades of being excluded from the global economy 
through wars and sanctions, a common perception is that Vietnam, by opening up to 
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global investment and joining the World Trade Organization in 2007, is “catching up 
with the rest of the world.”  But this narrative ignores the larger political and 
economic forces which shaped economic outcomes in Vietnam.  
 The US sanctions against Vietnam (starting in 1951 in North Vietnam and 
going from 1975-1994 for all of Vietnam, after the 1975 reunification) cut Vietnam 
off from trade, investment, and loans from not just U.S.-based firms and banks, but 
also from firms and banks in other countries, who were pressured by the U.S. to 
honor the U.S. embargo (Fallows 44). Because of the US influence, the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank also were prevented 
from giving loans, which could have been used, following the path of other 
countries, to rebuild infrastructure in the country after decades of devastation and 
war (Fallows 45).  
The decades-long US embargo severely impeded the Vietnamese economy 
and contributed to the low economic growth rate. Surprisingly, however, the U.S. 
embargo is not often mentioned in the mainstream narrative about these two 
decades of reconstruction and recovery, which are universally remembered as times 
of incredible hardship and suffering. Rather, the popular discourse emphasizes 
Vietnamese agency and responsibility for their policy choices. The period in 1986 of 
Đỏi Mới, is when Vietnam “mở cửa,” or opened its doors, to the global economy. No 
mention is made of the US sanctions, which kept the door tightly closed. 
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In a similar manner, larger global economic constraints is rarely mentioned 
in present-day discussions of Vietnam’s economic development policy and 
evolution, or in discussions on climate change adaptation. But Vietnam does not 
make these decisions in a vacuum. The next section explores ways in which 
Vietnam’s export-oriented growth model constrains how much choice or autonomy 
Vietnamese cities have to control their increasingly market-oriented urban 
development. The following section explores the substantial contradictions and 
challenges of Vietnam’s apparent economic success, including its growing 
dependence on debt to fund urban infrastructure and development.  
 
Urban Entrepreneurialism and the Provincial Competitiveness Index 
Under Đỏi Mới, Vietnamese cities, particularly the larger Tier 1 cities such as 
Can Tho, Hanoi, Hai Phong, Danang, and Ho Chi Minh City, have more autonomy to 
determine their economic growth strategies. The decentralization and devolution of 
responsibility, means that local city governments need to find local sources of 
revenue to invest in their local infrastructure, both for their own residents, and also 
to attract outside investors. Swyngedouw (2010) describes the simultaneous 
diffusion of power both downward (increasing power and responsibility to local 
governments) and upward (increasing power of global institutions like finance 
capital) as “glocalization.”   As a Director at the Academy of Managers of 
Construction, which trains urban managers throughout the country, explained:  
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Each mayor is like the CEO of his own city. How can he develop strategies to 
attract investment, how to develop culture, improve infrastructure so his city 
can compete? How to develop cluster economies, so industries can 
agglomerate? How to connect to the global network, to create opportunities. 
For example, how can your city attract companies and rich people to invest in 
your city to create opportunities? You need to have cooperation between 
corporations, government, and citizens. (personal interview, 2017) 
 
                                                                                                                             
His rhetoric reflects a fundamental shift in how Vietnamese city officials envision 
their responsibility. Whereas in the pre-Doi Moi era, more autonomous rural 
development was emphasized, today, cities are seen as a key site for industrial 
development that can attract outside industries and investments. City managers, 
thus, are being trained to increasingly think about agglomeration economies and 
public-private partnerships to attract investment.  
 Although land is still owned by the state, local governments have the ability 
to sell land use rights, that range from short-term agricultural land leases to long-
term urban residential leases, which can be passed on to children. Revenue from the 
sale of land use rights makes up a significant portion of cities’ revenues, yet because 
these are one-time fees and because there is not a significant property tax structure 
in place, cities do not have a dependable stream of income from property taxes 
(Trinh and McCluskey, 2010: 55). Given the rapid, messy, and still unfolding 
transition from a collectivized state-owned property system now to a quasi-private 
property system of land use-rights, the process of setting up a system of valuation 
for properties is challenging.  
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 In this absence of a significant property tax, cities are dependent on these 
one-time sales of these land use rights, which creates a structural incentive sell land 
and to continue urban expansion. In addition, because agricultural land is cheaper 
than urban land (Nguyen, S. 2009: 19), it also creates incentives to develop onto 
farmlands, rather than urban land, since farmland is much cheaper, so the greatest 
profit can be made. These structural incentives play an important role in driving 
urban expansion and the loss of surrounding farmland, and the subsequent 
displacement of residents in the outer less-developed periphery of cities.  
Over the last two decades, large Vietnamese cities become increasingly more 
responsible for setting up the infrastructure needed to attract foreign investment. 
Driven by the need to attract capital, cities are perpetually in competition to become 
an “international” city that is more attractive to foreign investors than other cities 
(Harvey 1973). Yet in Vietnam, the criteria for what makes a region attractive is 
unclear to many leaders. Having invested millions in building freeways and setting 
up industrial zones, some cities and provinces are confused to find that their 
industrial zones sit under-utilized (Q. Nguyen, 2017).  The blame is always put back 
on the government for its failure to provide an attractive environment for investors 
(Shira, 2017)  
When asked about his vision for his province in the next 20 years, the 
second-highest ranking provincial officer in Quang Nam province declared that he 
wanted to make his province one of the top twenty highest-ranked provinces in the 
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Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI). Developed by the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce with support from USAID, the PCI Index ranks Vietnam’s 54 provinces 
based on a variety of indicators, including perceptions of land access and security of 
tenure, entry costs, transparency and access to information, informal costs 
(bribery), time costs and regulatory compliance, legal institutions, labor and 
training, and business support services, (PCI website).  
The fact that the PCI would have such an influence on a city leader highlights 
how important attracting outside investment has become to the city leaders, often at 
the cost of other regulatory responsibilities. The PCI explains, for example, that 
“Time costs and regulatory compliance” reflects “how much time firms waste on 
bureaucratic compliance, as well as for how long firms must shut down for 
inspections by local regulatory agencies.” The indicators for this measurement 
include: “the percentage of firms spending over 10% of their time dealing with 
bureaucratic regulations”, the median number of inspections by any agency; and a 
subjective assessment if “government officials have become more effective (%Yes).” 
The political ideology embedded in the PCI sees state regulation as “bureaucratic” 
and a “waste” of a firm’s time, calling for a “rollback” of such meddlesome state 
intervention. Yet not all government intervention is considered negative, since the 
PCI looks favorably upon increasing public investments in job training and business 
support services. These business support services, which include “private sector 
trade promotion, business partner matchmaking, and provision of industrial zones 
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or clusters, reflect the corollary “roll-out” of new neoliberal institutions and public-
private partnerships required by international capital today.  
In addition, Vietnam’s one-party state can also guarantee the legal 
suppression and control of workers through the Vietnam General Federation of 
Labour, which is one of the many mass organizations led by the Communist Party. 
Independent trade unions are prohibited in Vietnam, and the state actively 
intervenes to keep wages and labor resistance low, in order to remain competitive 
(Human Rights Watch 2009). As The Economist reports: 
The foreign chambers also complained about Vietnamese labour laws 
that limit workers to 200 hours of overtime a year, or 300 hours in 
some circumstances. This is far below the 900 hours of overtime 
allowed in other countries in the region, such as Thailand and 
Malaysia, and means that some companies struggle to fill orders 
during the busiest times of the year. … For some companies, the 
prospect of expanding operations in countries such as Indonesia, 
Myanmar and Cambodia appears increasingly attractive. The latest 
EuroCham Vietnam survey found that 34% of respondents planned to 
ramp up their operations in the country, compared with 42% in the 
previous poll. (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013)  
In these ways, the authoritarian neoliberal city represents another manifestation of 
the new global cities emerging from the neoliberal discipline being imposed 
throughout the world.  
Given this context in which the Vietnamese government’s largest priority is 
to stimulate economic growth, the separation of discussions of economic 
development strategy and climate adaptation strategy undermines the potential for 
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success of the adaptation strategies, and in the long-term, the economic 
development strategies as well. The next section explores the role that international 
finance and capital play in constraining the choices for development projects that 
build climate resilience.  
Role of International Finance and Capital in Determining Development 
 After decades of war and sanctions, Vietnamese cities needed and still need 
capital to invest in roads, freeways, water systems, and other large-scale 
infrastructure systems for their own urban development and also to attract more 
outside investment. In order to build the freeways, bridges, and water and energy 
infrastructure demanded by residents and foreign investors, Vietnamese cities have 
to take out loans of often hundreds of millions of dollars from both public and 
private financial institutions. These international financial institutions exercise 
tremendous power over Vietnam’s economic and political restructuring through 
their loans, as well as through their advice, technical assistance, and assessments of 
Vietnam’s macroeconomic conditions and investment environment.  
For example, from 2012-2016 the World Bank committed to supporting 
economic and policy reform in Vietnam through its five-year National Partnership 
Strategy (2012-2016), which focuses on “manpower development, market 
mechanism enhancement, and infrastructure development” (Saigon Times, July 28, 
2012). Victoria Kwakwa, the World Bank’s Country Director for Vietnam, points out 
that the World Bank would provide $1-$1.5 Billion in financing in 2012 alone to 
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support these strategies. The World Bank’s significant lending and aid financing to 
Vietnam indicate its growing influence in Vietnam’s policy reforms and state 
restructuring. Statements from World Bank Vice President for East Asia and Pacific 
region Pamela Cox, and from Vietnamese Finance Minister Vuong Dinh Hue, during 
Cox’s visit to Hanoi on July 26, 2012, highlight how the World Bank loans are 
intended to build a legal framework for the restructuring of state-run businesses” 
(Nhan Dan newspaper, July 26, 2017). Given the power asymmetry between the 
World Bank and Vietnam, it’s not surprising that international institutions like the 
World Bank are often invited to help essential rewrite the legal frameworks and 
policies in Vietnam. Thus, when Cox urges the country to “boost the reform process, 
and restructure public investment, the financial sector and State-owned 
enterprises” (Saigon Times, July 28, 2012), these recommendations have a powerful 
influence on Vietnamese policy, backed up by hundreds of millions of dollars in 
loans that are conditioned on Vietnam taking steps towards these financial and state 
industrial sector reforms. 
At the end of June 2017, Vietnam is no longer eligible for most concessional 
financing (with lower interest rates and more generous repayment periods) from 
the World Bank, due to Vietnam’s entrance into middle-income status. The World 
Bank’s lead economist in Hanoi, Sebastian Eckhardt, explained in an interview that 
“Vietnam’s financing needs are growing rapidly, and official financing will not be 
enough to meet the development needs of the country -- so an increasing share of 
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the financing will have to be mobilized from capital markets.” (World Bank press 
release 2016). Thus, in the last few years, Vietnam has increasingly had to turn to 
the capital markets to sell bonds which pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and 
hedge funds can purchase.   
 Vietnam’s dependence on private international financing for major 
infrastructure projects has huge significant impacts on its economic development 
strategies. Paying back these loans requires foreign currency, and the only way to 
get foreign currency is through exports. The export-driven development strategy 
manifests itself in urban development through the prioritization of industrial zones, 
or industrial parks, which consist of land that has been set aside with specific state 
strategies to attract new manufacturing plants  Public funds in these industrial 
zones include investments in freeways, electricity and energy infrastructure, and 
access to water (Shira, 2017).  
 This orientation towards external markets means that domestic needs and 
consumption are often neglected or less emphasized. For example, infrastructure 
investments to help the urban poor have access to basic services go unfunded, while 
investments are funneled instead to polluting industrial zones that offer valuable 
foreign currency (2010, Hildyard). Moreover, infrastructure investments prioritize 
the rate of return on investment, often at the expense of building climate resilience.  
Michael Digregorio pointed out that in this new age of market liberalization, it can 
be difficult to even know where the investment is coming from. “Someone could be 
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building a new resort in Danang with a company registered in Vietnam, but you 
can’t see that the funding is coming from Korea, or Japan, or has an off-shore 
subsidiary,” he explained. “You can’t see Chinese money.”  Foreign investors looking 
for higher profits are less likely to be feel responsible for communities and 
ecosystems that are located far away.  
 Thus, Vietnam’s climate change adaptation strategies are heavily influenced 
by the directives and priorities of the international financial institutions that also 
shape their climate adaptation and economic development strategies.   In this way, 
Vietnam’s liberalization means that the state is not necessarily being dismantled, 
but rather is being reformed as a more effective vehicle to advance market-led 
development. The next section explores the ways which the Vietnamese state is 
transforming its role in the post-socialist economy.  
The “Rollback” of Corporate Taxes and State-Owned Enterprises  
 Under Vietnam’s unique form of neoliberalism, the one-party state retains 
complete control over all levels of government, and plays an active role in investing 
public money to attract private investment. For example, Prime Minister Nguyen 
Xuan Phuc recently announced in March of 2018, that Vietnam would be cutting the 
corporate income tax rates from the current 20-22% to 15-17% (Nhan Dan 2018). 
In an effort to make Vietnam more competitive, Prime Minister Phuc also said that 
tax reform and creating a favorable business environment were top priorities of 
Vietnam’s government (Nhan Dan 2018). The rollback of corporate taxes is a clear 
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example of the shift in the role of the Vietnamese state, as reduced tax revenue 
means fewer funds to invest in social services.   
The restructuring of the state-owned enterprise sector is another example of 
the neoliberal project to “roll back” various forms of state intervention as part of a 
state-led market liberalization process. In the 1970s and 1980s before ĐỏiMới 
reforms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam operated “in a highly centrally 
planned and subsidized environment.” Prior to 1986, “the state assigned to SOEs 
plans which had been approved by higher government levels, which included a 
system of targets, such as gross output, total value of production, main products, 
totally payroll, profits, and transfers to the government budget. The government 
supplied the main materials, provided the markets for the products, and set their 
selling prices.” (Nguyen and Tran 1996).  Present-day SOEs are more autonomous 
and responsible for their profit-making, and thus have become more market-
oriented. Nonetheless, SOEs remain powerful in the Vietnamese economy and critics 
decry SOE’s poor performance, arguing that they drain government resources, 
without clear transparency about decision-making and profits.  
 According to the World Bank and other general international financial 
institutions, the “inefficiency” of SOEs is holding back the competitiveness of the 
Vietnamese economy (Hai and O’Donnell, 2017; “World Bank Wants to Help 
Vietnam Speed Up Reform,” 2012). Today, the World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank continue to call for the restructuring of the SOE sector. "The majority of the 
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SOE sector in Vietnam is not using the public resources in the most efficient way,” 
Victoria Kwakwa, the head of the World Bank office in Vietnam, recently stated. “To 
keep moving forward to reform these two key sectors will be critical for enhancing 
the competitiveness of Vietnamese economy" (Xinhua, March 30, 2012). 
The reform of the state-owned enterprise sector in Vietnam has involved 
converting small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises into joint stock 
companies with limited liabilities, (Asian Development Bank Newsbrief, December 
22, 2011). According to the ADB website, “many of the remaining SOEs are large, 
complex and weak performers, accounting for 40% of assets in the enterprise 
sector.” Following up on an earlier “multi-tranche financing facility,” another grant 
of $1.2 million will be devoted to provide technical assistance to the Ministry of 
Finance to “update institutional and policy frameworks governing SOE 
restructuring, drawing on lessons learned from pilot restructurings.” Despite 
significant concerns and critiques of the privatization process becoming a source of 
windfall profits for some well-connected elites, the ADB, World Bank, and other 
international financial leaders continue to push the drumbeat for privatization. The 
pressures to privatize state-owned enterprises mark a fundamental restructuring of 
Vietnam’s economy (Janssen, 2017).  From the financial sector to the state-owned 
enterprise sector, Vietnam’s economy is undergoing a structural adjustment that is 
driven by its need for external capital, primarily in the form of loans from 
international financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development 
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Bank. Increasingly, countries giving Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) are 
replacing funding for development aid with “climate finance” to encourage climate 
mitigation and adaptation projects (Brown et al., 2010). In this way, Vietnam’s 
climate change adaptation strategies are heavily influenced by the directives and 
priorities of the international financial institutions that also shape their economic 
development strategies.  
Public-Private Partnerships and Infrastructure as an Asset Class  
Vietnam’s turn to public-private partnerships is one example of the 
increasing power of private capital in shaping infrastructure development choices. 
Vietnam’s decision to focus on export-oriented development means that a large 
amount of industrial infrastructure must be built to attract foreign investors. 
Vietnam currently invests 5.7% of its GDP in infrastructure, the highest rate in 
Southeast Asia (“Vietnam Is Heavyweight Among Asia’s Infrastructure Spenders,” 
2017). However, the Asian Development Bank estimates that Vietnam needs at least 
$480 billion from 2017-2030 to meet its growing list of infrastructure needs as an 
industrializing country, including highways, dike systems, ports, industrial zones, 
and power plants.  (Janssen, 2017). Arguing that governments do not have enough 
money to pay for the vast amount of infrastructure needed for Vietnam to become a 
leading export-driven economy in Asia, multilateral development banks like the 
World Bank and China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are 
encouraging Vietnam to “leverage domestic and international capital markets, and 
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attract private investments” to fund export zones, transportation corridors and 
other industrial infrastructure (Lauridson, 2017, UNESCAP 2017). 
 The increasing dependence of Vietnam on public-private partnerships to 
fund industrial and even basic services infrastructure represents the neoliberal 
expansion of state institutions to roll back the responsibilities of state governments, 
while advance the power and control of the private sector. These public-private 
partnerships come in a variety of forms, from BOO (Build-Own-Operate) 
agreements to BOT (Build-Own-Transfer)2 to other complex arrangements, but 
what they share in common is some kind of contractual guarantee from the 
government of profit. As Jean Perarnaud of Partners Group, a private equity 
investment management firm, explained, “For us, infrastructure is stable, contracted 
cash flow for the long term” (as quoted in Hildyard 2014). This steady cash flow 
comes from contractual agreements that governments sign, giving payment 
guarantees, revenue guarantees, and legal rights to keep the state’s infrastructure 
until the state has paid its debts to the companies. Governments must provide some 
government-backed guarantees of long-term profitability; thus the government 
shoulders the risk for new projects, while private company is guaranteed a profit. 
                                                                 
2 Under the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model, a private entity builds owns, and operates a facility, 
while under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, a private entity constructs and operates a facility 
for a certain number of years, recovering its investment through revenue from the project. After a 
certain number of years, ownership and operation of the facility is transferred back to the state.  
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Previously, public international development funders such as the World 
Bank or the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), were primary 
funders of infrastructure development. Today, however, given the funding gap for 
ambitious infrastructure projects (ranging from new oil refineries, and pipelines, to 
more mundane water treatment plants), private equity firms are increasingly 
playing a larger role in infrastructure financing. Because of activist and advocacy 
pressure, the World Bank has adopted a list of required safeguard assessments—
including assessments of impacts on the environment, indigenous peoples, 
involuntary resettlement, safety of dams, projects in disputed areas, and projects on 
international waterways. The private equity firms, however, have weaker or non-
existent safeguard policies, as demonstrated by the aggressive funding of 
destructive coal-fired plans. The World Bank and other development banks begun to 
back away from funding new fossil fuel infrastructure (Elliott, 2017), in part due to 
pressure from advocates to honor the climate mitigation policies adopted by their 
home countries.  The un-transparent and unaccountable structure of private equity 
firms makes it more difficult to lobby for socially beneficial outcomes on 
investments.  Again, the overall development goal is key to determining the type of 
infrastructure needed. Infrastructure decisions are not politically neutral. “There is 
more than enough public money available to fund the everyday infrastructure 
needed to ensure heating, lighting, healthcare, clean water and other amenities for 
ordinary people,” writes Nicholas Hildyard (2016). “But there is not the money 
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available through conventional infrastructure finance to fund the just-in-time 
corridors that capital needs.” 
Whereas previously infrastructure was seen as an unprofitable “public good,” 
private equity firms are increasingly seeing public private partnerships as an 
opportunity to gain public underwriting and guarantees for projects that offer 
steady returns at above-average profit rates of between 13 to 25% (Hildyard 2014). 
Goldman Sachs, in their report “Building the World,” advances a very explicit policy 
agenda for expanding private financing of infrastructure projects in which 
“governmental interference” is kept “at a minimum.” At the same time, they demand 
the expansion of state intervention and subsidies in the form of “public/private 
partnerships, government credit guarantees, and coinvestment by governments.” 
(Goldman Sachs, as quoted by Hildyard 2010). In Vietnam, private financing and 
public-private partnerships are increasingly seen as the only solution to the 
widening infrastructure funding gap.  
The Long Phu 1 coal-fired power plant described in Chapter 2 is but one 
example of many coal-fired power plants funded or searching for funds using 
public-private partnership agreements. Expected to cost roughly $1.9 billion, the 
project has already gotten funding from a Russian development bank Vnesheconom. 
To fill the remaining funding needed, HSBC Bank, Cathay United Bank, JP 
MorganChase, and Mitsubishi UFJ have signed on as the “lead arrangers behind a 
planned $650 million loan for the plant” (BankTrack website 2018). Despite the 
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Paris Climate Accord goals, which require a steady decline in coal production and 
which the United Kingdom, Japan, China, and Russia all signed, their export credit 
agencies and national and multinational development banks have all chosen to fund 
this nearly $2 billion coal-fired power plant, locking Vietnam into decades of 
burning dirty coal with older technology.   
The public private partnerships for infrastructure development highlight the 
role that private finance is increasingly playing in determining infrastructure in 
Vietnam, developments that are ostensibly aimed to strengthen climate adaptation 
or expand access to public services.  Vietnam’s increasing dependence on 
international loans and the demands of their private and public funders requires 
that short-term profit returns are often prioritized over the long-term needs of 
building communities’ climate resilience. 
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 Chapter 5:  Critique of  mainstream climate change adaptation  
 
The construction of climate change adaptation knowledge is inextricably 
linked to the international development and international finance industries.  
International development/financial institutions such as the Asian Development 
Bank, World Bank, and United Nations, lead efforts to study and document climate 
impacts, risks, and vulnerability. 
 In recent years, international financial institutions like the Asian 
Development Bank and World Bank have moved beyond merely giving out money. 
They now play critical roles as creators, aggregators, and purveyors of knowledge 
(“Knowledge Bank,” World Bank website). Indeed, the power of public international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and development agencies such as 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), stems not simply from their large 
loans and aid packages, but from their control over the dominant conceptualizations 
of how economies should be run, what good governance looks like, and now 
increasingly, how countries should respond and adapt to climate change. Although 
in their materials on their website, knowledge is presented as an unproblematic 
‘good,’ in fact these ideas (about policy frameworks, how to set up economic 
institutions) are deeply political and enforce a particular system of political, 
economic, and social relations.   
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 The ISET Urban Climate Resilience Framework in Figures 2 and 3, is one 
example of common climate adaptation frameworks for understanding the process 
of building a community’s adaptive capacity or resilience in the face of climate 
change. Other NGOs, such as CARE, or international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank have similar approaches, all of which feature a process of assessing a 
community’s exposure, sensitivity, and vulnerability to climate hazards, with a 
corresponding process for gathering stakeholders together to plan, prioritize, 
implement, and evaluate actions taken to strengthen community resilience.  
 
FIGURE 2: ISET URBAN CLIMATE RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK 
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While vulnerability assessments are a key step in climate adaptation 
planning, the root causes of those vulnerabilities must also be addressed. The ISET 
Framework lumps all individuals, households, communities, businesses, 
governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, under the 
category of “Agents,” without delving into the unequal power relations between 
Agents which are in fact at the root of many of communities’ vulnerability. ISET’s 
Urban Climate Resilience Framework explains that communities that are politically, 
socially, or economically marginalized, such as slum dwellers, people living in 
floodplain areas, low-income renters, women, and women-headed households, are 
particularly vulnerable to climate hazards (Moench, Tyler, et al 2011). Although 
these communities are undoubtedly more vulnerable to climate change, the 
 
FIGURE 3: CORE ELEMENTS OF ISET'S URBAN CLIMATE RESILIENCY FRAMEWORK 
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framework and other mainstream approaches treat vulnerability as a characteristic 
or condition of groups of people, not a consequence (James, et al. 2015). In reality, 
these communities’ vulnerabilities are the result of other social, economic, and 
political systems and inequalities.  
By not addressing the inherent economic and political systems in which this 
climate change adaptation is embedded, these discussions of climate change 
adaptation and green growth are missing important analyses that would help cities 
look comprehensively at the real conditions and forces which they need to address if 
they want to realistically prepare for the current and coming climate impacts. 
Movement Generation Justice & Ecology Project, a non-profit organization based in 
Oakland, CA, writes in Pathways to Resilience (2015): 
[In conventional climate adaptation frameworks], the policy and 
practices that have been brought to bear don’t address the underlying 
historical roots of vulnerability. In fact, they often exacerbate 
vulnerability by denying communities the chance to address economic 
disparity when leading adaptation and mitigation efforts (25). 
The failure to interrogate the existing political and economic systems make it more 
likely that proposed climate solutions might actually hurt vulnerable communities 
and exacerbate inequalities. For example, seawalls displace fisherpeople, while also 
leading to greater coastal erosion in the next town lacking seawalls, and roads that 
are built higher to allow cars to avoid flooding, end up increasing flooding for those 
villages upstream from the elevated roads.  
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Good governance and the post-political approach 
Critical urban theorists have used the term “post-political” to describe the 
ways in which contemporary consensus-based planning has erased the conflicts 
over power and resources (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2010). 
Rather than confront and challenge the unequal power relations which are 
embedded in urban planning challenges, the post-political approach focuses on 
participatory processes to strengthen and validate the inherently political choices 
being made. Similarly, the literature produced by international NGOs and 
governmental agencies suggests that effective climate change adaptation is 
primarily about improving urban planning processes and reforming institutions to 
be more transparent, accountable, and participatory so that local people can be 
more engaged in directing and carrying out adaptive strategies (World Resources 
Institute, 2011).  The IMF, World Bank and other international institutions have 
declared "good governance as a necessary prerequisite for almost any development 
goal, whether economic growth or effective urban development (IMF 2012). These 
“good governance” practices include improving government transparency, 
accountability, participatory processes, consensus-based decision-making, and the 
prioritization of equity and inclusion.  
Many of these “good governance” reforms are theoretically beneficial, yet 
they are rooted in Western liberal democratic traditions, and in Vietnam’s political 
system, with a one-party authoritarian state and no independent media or trade 
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unions and a very weak civil society, it is questionable how well these governance 
reforms can be effectively translated, taught, and adopted. In addition, the clear 
emphasis on public-private partnerships and infrastructure projects suggest that 
these reforms are focused more on making Vietnam a more investment-friendly 
environment, than on promoting democratic participation or mechanisms for public 
accountability.  
The apolitical “good governance” perspective for climate resilience 
emphasizes integrated management of resources (such as water management at the 
watershed basin scale) and encouraging different sectors to better coordinate plans. 
These practical solutions fit within the dominant technocratic solutions presented 
by most international non-governmental organizations. What is noticeably missing 
is a discussion of the underlying urban expansion model and the dependence of the 
city government on the continuing sale of land for a significant portion of its 
revenues. The expansion of urban development into coastal wetlands and estuaries 
increases a city’s vulnerability to sea level rise, flooding, and typhoons. Of course, it 
is easier to discuss technocratic reforms, than to discuss transforming the 
fundamental economic basis of the city. Yet the underlying economic model of the 
city is of critical importance and relevance to a city’s climate change adaptation.  
Without a doubt, stories of uncoordinated development abound, as my 
interview participants could attest. Better coordination, integrated planning, and 
good governance practices would indeed improve a city’s ability to develop and 
   
74 
implement a plan to adapt to climate change. Yet in this framework, the larger 
economic and political systems in which this planning and governance is embedded, 
is never mentioned. Better intersectoral coordination and participatory processes 
will have limited impact if the larger economic development systems and pressures 
towards growth are left unchanged.  
Given that independent trade unions and political demonstrations are 
prohibited and the state has a strong incentive to suppress strikes and worker 
dissent, the emphasis on inclusive participation seems somewhat naïve. The 
Vietnamese mass organizations such as the Women’s Union, the Vietnamese Trade 
Union, the Youth Union, the Farmer’s Union, do offer one mechanism for public 
participation. Indeed, many NGOs rely on such state structures to be able to have 
access to particular constituencies of “women farmers” or “youth” for their 
participatory workshops. But given that these mass organizations are embedded 
firmly within the Vietnamese Community Party organizational structure, de facto 
arms of the Communist Party, the participation of such women farmers or workers, 
may not result in the same diversity of perspectives envisioned in the theoretical 
frameworks put forth under collaborative governance and communicative planning.  
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The ‘good governance’ 
framework does emphasize 
equity and inclusion, but 
remains silent on the power 
inequalities between 
stakeholders, such as peasant 
farmers and the global 
companies seeking to build an industrial park.  The simplified frameworks for 
participatory decisionmaking in mainstream discourses on participatory climate 
change assessments and prioritizations thus ignore, and thus serve to reinforce the 
unequal power relations. In these frameworks, it seems completely irrational for 
local governments develop in ways that are completely contradictory to what would 
be in the long-term and even short-term interests of their residents.  Within this 
post-political discourse, writes Jessop (2002), “pollution and environmental 
destruction appear to be facts of nature, rather than products of specific sets of 
social relations” (469). In Vietnam, environmental damage is treated as unintended 
consequences that can be fixed by better management and coordination, rather than 
inevitable outcomes intrinsic to Vietnam’s development strategy. As Edgar Pieterse 
(2008) writes, “There is no explicit line drawn between the conditions the 
document seeks to remedy and the causal drivers of those conditions” (68). The 
emphasis on effective planning and coordination to respond to climate change 
 
FIGURE 4: UNITED NATIONS GOOD GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK 
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adaptation reinforces this post-political erasure of the unequal social relations 
which cause disparate climate vulnerability, as well as the political choices involves.  
Despite the supposed separation of climate science from politics, climate 
adaptation planning requires value-laden decisions, not simply technical decisions, 
about what areas of town should be protected, at what cost, and what groups’ 
interests should be prioritized. Should the hotel developers be protected with an 
investment in sea dykes which come at great cost, and offer only temporary 
protection? What about the fisherpeople who have been resettled to make way for 
the hotels? The adaptations needed often involve fundamental, transformational 
actions, such as relocation from an area that will become increasingly inundated, or 
livelihood diversification for farmers. These are not purely objective decisions that 
can be determined by experts, but in fact demand deliberation and participation by 
the people who will be expected to change their lives and who will bear the brunt of 
the impacts of these changes.  
Without a power analysis, these methodologies for climate change decision-
making remain idealistic guidelines without giving people the analytical tools 
needed to confront the high-stakes, life-and-death decisions that need to be made. 
The loose definition of eco-city development leads some city governments to frame 
the actions of neoliberal development within the discourse of sustainable 
development and climate change adaptation.  For example, in Danang, the city 
government has produced city development plans that emphasize their goal to 
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become an eco-city by eliminating industrial pollution ‘hotspots,’ improving waste 
management and land use planning, and re-orienting urban development practices 
to be more environmentally-sensitive and sustainable. (Nguyen DONRE Danang 
presentation 2009). Some of the key accomplishments of which Danang is proud, 
include: “the removal of all slums (350 households) living on the banks of the Han 
River and the resettlement of over 60,000 households.” These ‘environmental 
projects’ are essentially what in the US is known as urban renewal, according to 
Professor Burkhard von Rabeneau (personal communication 2012). This conflation 
of urban renewal with climate change adaptation reveals the embeddedness of 
climate change policy in existing economic and political systems of power. Just as 
over 60,000 households can be moved in the name of sustainable city development, 
government-sponsored climate change adaptation can also reinforce the existing 
power relations that are already pushing out poor people from desirable land in the 
city. Unless the powerful economic forces reshaping the city are acknowledged in 
climate change plans, climate change adaptation strategies remain woefully 
inadequate and ill-equipped to adapt to climate-related change and build climate 
resilience.  
Green Growth as the new Post-Political Framework for Action 
In attempting to balance economic, social, and environmental demands, 
Vietnam has embraced the popular concept of “green growth” as a win-win-win 
solution that address the needs of cities looking for more investment and looking to 
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prepare for climate change. The Asian Development Bank declares: “Green growth is 
economic progress that fosters environmentally sustainable low-carbon and socially 
inclusive development.” Green growth, or “climate-smart development” has become 
an increasingly popular focus for other international development funders. In 2012, 
South Korea pledged financial support for Vietnam’s Green Growth strategy, and Ha 
Chan-ho, Korean Ambassador to Vietnam, said “green growth is one of the three key 
areas in Korea’s Country Partnership Strategy with Vietnam,” at the signing 
ceremony of a memorandum of understanding. In 2016, South Korea’s Global Green 
Growth Institute (GGGI) and Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment signed 
a five-year partnership strategy called the GGGI Vietnam Country Planning 
Framework 2016-2020 to “work together to deliver green growth in the finance, 
urban and energy sectors”(Vietnam Investment Review 2016). 
Although opportunities exist for enterprises to make money through more 
environmentally friendly or even regenerative practices, many resilience-building 
activities such as restoring wetlands as part of coastal protection efforts, will remain 
unprofitable, especially compared to other business projects. Implicit in this green 
growth strategy is an assumption that Vietnam’s current orientation towards 
export-driven economic growth is compatible with efforts to protect the 
environment and human health, and to adapt to climate change. A joint United 
Nations/Asian Development Bank report explains: “A key concept in approaching 
green growth is recognition that economic, social and environmental systems are 
actually complementary, not in conflict. For those focusing on the environment, 
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green growth is a way to reduce environmental stress; for economists, it can offer 
increased profits and competitiveness; and for social scientists, it can contribute to 
ensuring that basic needs are met” (Green Growth, Resources, and Resilience, 2012, p. 
xv) 
 Under this framework, even catastrophic climate change offers an 
opportunity for economic growth. As this report from the Economics of Climate 
Change Working Group titled “Shaping Climate-Resilient Development: A 
Framework for Decision-Making” (2009) explains: 
Climate resilience boosts economic development. These adaptation 
measures are in many cases also effective steps to strengthen economic 
development. This is particularly so in the agricultural cases, where 
measures to adapt to climate risk, such as increased focus on cash crops, 
can generate revenues greatly exceeding the climate-related loss averted 
by those measures—and so contribute to improvements in national or 
regional wealth. For example, in Mali, greater cultivation of cash crops 
would provide on the order of $2bn in additional revenue for the 
country. --“The Economics of Climate Change Adaptation” (36) 
This narrow GDP-based conceptualization of climate change impacts ignores the 
ways in which a shift to greater cultivation of cash crops would endanger food 
security, without any guarantee that the benefits from additional export revenues 
would be equitably distributed (Altieri et al., 2012). In reality, the current drive to 
increase exports places tremendous pressures on cities to sacrifice environmental 
and human health in order to attract investment and stimulate economic growth.  
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Several cities in the central region of Vietnam, including Danang and Hoi An, 
have expressed interest in becoming eco-cities in the future (von Rabeneau, 2012). 
The definition of what it means to be an eco-city, remains unclear, however. In 
Danang, for example, eco-city projects include the construction of luxury resorts, a 
wastewater treatment plant (with support from a World Bank loan), and an 
information technology industrial zone. In this way, the flexible interpretations and 
labeling of eco-city projects suggest that many of these ‘green-growth’ strategies are 
often simply another way to attract both development loans and investment to 
areas of Vietnam.  
In a report on Danang’s urban development strategies, Burkhard von 
Rabeneau describes how the city government is trucking in tons of dirt to fill in 
floodplain/estuary areas because the city is running out of land to sell (von 
Rabeneau, personal communication, 2012). Clearly, this development of a 
floodplain/estuary increases Danang’s vulnerability to floods, yet the structural 
logic of Danang’s current revenue system almost forces cities to continually expand 
outwards, even if it means destroying land that could reduce flood risks and damage 
by hurricanes and storms. Without addressing these structural pressures of 
economic growth, the green growth discourse reflects the same post-political 
orientation of the good governance and climate change adaptation discourse.  
In the narrative of building urban climate resilience in Vietnam, green 
growth has become the new strategy for financial institutions seeking to continue 
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lending money to Vietnam, while also acknowledging the dire threats facing 
Vietnam in the future. The post-political framework accepts the current “market-as-
supreme” capitalist system as an immutable fact of nature, rather than a particular 
system in this historical moment, that is undermining the very ecological 
foundations (stable climate, coastlines, and precipitation patterns) upon which this 
current economy depends.  
Given that international financial institutions, development agencies, and 
private foundations are deeply integrated into the global economic system, perhaps 
it should not be surprising that the dominant climate change adaptation narrative 
and approach in Vietnam accepts neoliberalism as the unquestioned underlying 
political-economic framework within which Vietnam must implement its adaptation 
strategies. Jameson states that in the current neoliberal era, perhaps “it is easier to 
imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism” (Jameson, 2003: 
73, as quoted in Swyngedouw, 2010: 216). Indeed, the hegemonic nature of global 
neoliberalism does make it difficult to imagine replacing free market global 
capitalism with a less ecologically and socially destructive system. Yet the growing 
signs of ecological devastation and predictions of even further devastation in the 
coming decades suggest that Vietnam’s market-driven, growth-at-all-costs economic 
model must be addressed in order to make any significant progress on climate 
change adaptation.  
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion  
Given the devastating impacts that the projected flooding, drought, 
hurricanes, and sea level rise are having and will have on millions of Vietnamese 
people within the next few decades, it is striking how decidedly reformist and 
technical are the recommendations of climate change adaptation practitioners. 
Effects of Vietnam’s growth-first economic development strategy are already 
undermining long-term viability of many economic sectors, from fishing to tourism 
to agriculture. From the deaths of coral reefs upon which fisheries depend 
(O’Loughlin, 2009), to the impact of extreme heat, saltwater intrusion, and drought 
on agriculture upon which the majority of Vietnamese rely on for survival (Fuchs, 
2010; Hong 2016; Tran, 2011), the signs are clear that continuing the “business-as-
usual” approach will result eventually, and likely within this century, in a collapse of 
many ecological and agricultural systems that underpin the economy (World Bank, 
2012). 
The failure of climate change adaptation and resilience literature to seriously 
interrogate overall economic development goals, pathways, and assumptions 
reflects a foundational weakness in theory and analysis that undermines Vietnam’s 
ability to successfully adapt to climate change. In this paper, I explored the ways in 
which mainstream climate change adaptation focuses on improving planning 
processes, while ignoring the larger political choices and economic models and 
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strategies which are assumed, yet never raised in the climate adaptation literature. 
To understand the discrepancy between the climate change adaptation discourse 
and actual practice, this paper examined Vietnam’s economic and institutional 
structures which drive urban development. By exploring Vietnam’s dependence on 
international loans for its infrastructure development, this section shows how 
Vietnamese cities’ abilities to choose a more sustainable and climate-resilient path 
are circumscribed by the restrictions imposed by global capital. Although 
opportunities do exist to combine economic development and climate change 
adaptation and poverty reduction, there are inevitable tradeoffs. A de-politicized 
win-win-win approach to climate change adaptation ignores the fundamental 
contradictions between Vietnam’s economic growth model, its revenue generating 
strategies, and its climate change adaptation and resiliency goals.  
Future Directions for Research  
The findings from my study suggest several important directions for future 
research. Future research is needed to delve more deeply into the institutional, 
political and economic forces that shape decision-making on urban infrastructure 
development. Through my initial document analysis and interviews, I began to 
uncover questions about the financing of projects and the expanding role of public-
private partnerships (PPP), but more research is needed to understand the role and 
influence of international financial institutions in the development process. A case 
study approach that focuses on one or more infrastructure projects could illuminate 
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the institutional and economic forces which shape decision-making, as well as the 
benefits and costs that cities assume in using public-private partnerships to fund 
such infrastructure. Additionally, in the last ten to fifteen years, China has become 
an important and powerful player in Vietnam’s infrastructure development, with a 
distinctly different approach from the World Bank and other Western financial 
institutions; further research is also needed to understand the implications of this 
shift in the source of infrastructure finance.  
Lastly, my study findings suggest that more research is needed to explore 
alternative models for urban development that support human health and build 
climate resilience. Feminist and ecological economics have long put forth alternative 
frameworks and strategies for development and progress, yet these frameworks 
have gained little traction in Vietnam. Further research is needed to understand 
Vietnamese discourses on development and progress. Given that several of my 
interviewees’ comments suggested a correlation between the expansion of free 
markets and private property with a corresponding political liberalization and an 
expansion of individual freedoms, future research is needed to explore the narrative 
strategies that are most effective in Vietnam to advance alternative urban 
development strategies that also build communities’ adaptive capacity. This final 
section explores some initial concepts for communicating new narratives about 
what development and climate resilience can look like.  
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Redefining Climate Adaptation and Resilience: A Vision for a Just Transition 
This thesis draws attention to the ways in which the mainstream climate 
change adaptation approaches, funded by international development and finance 
institutions, and implemented by Vietnamese planners and NGO professionals, are 
failing to propose solutions and strategies that are commensurate to the scale of the 
existential threat facing Vietnam. What’s needed is nothing less than a social, 
political and economic transformation. Recently social movements have used the 
term “just transition” to describe the process of moving from the old fossil fuel 
economy to a renewable, regenerative economy and society (James et al., 2015). The 
concept of a just transition originated in the 1960s from the trade union movement, 
in recognition that workers employed in destructive industries needed to be 
supported and trained to be able to find jobs in more regenerative and less harmful 
industries. Today, the concept of a just transition encompasses the idea that the 
transition to a new economy is not merely a technical transition of technologies, but 
also challenges the unjust power relations which underpin the current extractive 
fossil fuel economy. In this last section, I examine lessons from this study as well as 
from other communities and social movements that point to an alternative approach 
to building climate resilience in Vietnam.  
To begin with, building urban climate resilience must begin with an 
acknowledgment of the root causes of climate change. The false separation between 
climate mitigation and climate adaptation must end. One of the root causes of 
   
86 
climate change is the consumer-based growth economy, which depends on an 
extractive, fossil-fuel based energy infrastructure. As discussed earlier, the 
international development funders are themselves embedded in political economic 
systems that are dependent on maintaining unequal power relations. Rather than 
challenge the U.S. on its vastly disproportionate per capita emissions of greenhouse 
gases, the global climate change industry instead forces countries to look inward, 
and to focus on the ways in which their local actions of conserving forests or 
improving local planning, can help them adapt to catastrophic climate change which 
the funder and the larger unequal political and economic systems themselves are 
largely responsible.   
Secondly, building climate resilience and a just transition means moving 
money away from the fossil fuel economy and re-investing in a new renewable 
economy. The Vietnamese government believes that they have no choice-- that 
maintaining economic growth requires that they continue to fund oil exploration 
and more than double the number of coal-fired power plants from up to 20 coal 
plants in 2018 to 51 coal plants in 2030 (Chugh 2017).  It’s true that investing in 
solar and wind would offer new constraints—and opportunities—for industrial 
projects. But if the current type of unfettered growth-at-all-costs development is 
allowed to continue, Vietnam’s ecosystems upon which a majority of the population 
still depend on for their livelihoods, particularly in the coastal and Mekong Delta 
and Red River Delta regions, will collapse. One of the implicit assumptions of the 
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mainstream climate change adaptation approach is that we can avoid catastrophic 
climate change without fundamentally altering the current economy. Avoiding 
catastrophic climate change and building resilience to the inevitable impacts that 
are inevitable, requires that we must take a radically new approach.  
Thirdly, a new climate resilience framework should also address the causes 
of climate vulnerability. As discussed earlier, mainstream climate change adaptation 
literature treats vulnerability as a planning consideration, without examining the 
root causes. For example, planners are exhorted to reach out to low-income renters 
without residency permits be included in participatory planning workshops to 
ensure that their voices and experiences are included in the decision-making. Yet, 
the systemic causes of their lack of formal residency rights remains unaddressed. To 
be effective, solutions have to address the power inequalities which create such 
vulnerability.  
Fourthly, a just transition means democratic governance and participation of 
those most impacted.  While good governance is truly a prerequisite and foundation 
for climate change adaptation, the concept of good governance has to move beyond 
shallow definitions of corruption and transparency. Corruption does not merely 
mean accepting a personal bribe; it can also mean the many ways in which public 
funds are used to block democratic participation and to bolster private profit. 
Currently, Vietnamese city officials are more accountable to their superiors in the 
Party and in the government than they are to the people they serve. The lack of 
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democratic accountability leads to decisions that are made to benefit private 
interests at the expense of the common good, even if no bribes are exchanged. At the 
same time, transparency and accountability The democratization of governance that 
would allow those most directly impacted to lead is a critical step in being able to 
develop plans and projects that build authentic climate resilience.  
To finance such climate adaptation and resilience-building, Vietnam could 
explore progressive and redistributive carbon taxes that could generate 
reinvestment revenue, instead of depending on foreign loans that must be paid back. 
For example, British Columbia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden have instituted 
different versions of a carbon tax, reflecting the social and environmental costs of 
pollution and generating revenue that can then be reinvested in renewable energy 
projects or other projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These carbon 
taxes, by making fossil fuels more expensive, also make investments in renewable 
energy infrastructure more attractive. Analysts have pointed out that political 
realities and popular push-back have made it difficult for politicians to raise carbon 
taxes high enough to actually force changes in the use of fossil fuels (Jaccard, 2016). 
Therefore, the Vietnamese government will likely also need to institute some kinds 
of direct regulations to stop the expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure in Vietnam.  
In addition, a just transition in Vietnam must build on local history, culture, 
and traditional practices. Vietnam’s traditional approach to flood risk and 
vulnerability, exemplified in its “Living With Floods” (sống với lũ lụt) strategy, is an 
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example of an approach that draws from the local practical knowledge. Rather than 
seek to build ever-more dams and structures to control flooding, the “Living With 
Floods” strategy recognizes both the benefits and risks of annual flooding and uses 
strategies that seek to build community capacity to respond to flooding safely 
without depriving farmers of the beneficial sediments, nutrients and pest control 
that regular flooding brings (Digregorio and Huynh 14).  
Rather than a technocratic, “expert”-driven approach, the Vietnamese 
government could look to its own history of organizing a national movement of 
peasants, artists, students, and other ordinary Vietnamese people fighting for 
national liberation. Drawing from the rich and long history of community resilience 
during their decades of war would be one opportunity to tell the story of climate 
adaptation and resilience as part of a long history of Vietnamese resistance and 
resilience to foreign invasion. In this way, the adaptability, creativity, and collective 
solidarity which Vietnamese drew upon during the multiple wars for national 
independence would be seen as strengths that in fact Western ‘developed’ nations 
would be wise to learn from—a stark reversal of the ‘deficit-based’ paradigm which 
currently dominates much of the climate change discourse.  
Ultimately, climate change adaptation is not merely about making policy and 
technological changes; it’s also about changing people’s ideas about the kind of 
development they want. In Planning as Persuasive Storytelling, James Throgmorton 
(2003) argues that stories and storytelling are an extremely important but 
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undervalued part of planning and that good planning includes “collecting and telling 
stories about both the past and future.” Currently, as Vietnam is in a moment of 
political transition from a state-planned economy to an authoritarian free market 
economy, the official hegemonic narratives about the past, present, and future are 
themselves being reconstructed. Building climate resilience means challenging 
dominant narratives that we can address “climate change “as long as it doesn’t hurt 
economic development.” In truth, addressing the exploitative and extractive 
economy is key to addressing the root causes of the climate crisis. 
“Stories and the ‘foundation narratives’ we tell to each other have more than 
passing interest—they contain or suppress evolutionary possibilities,” argues 
Stephen Moore (2007). Currently, there does not exist a strong counter-narrative 
that offers a more attractive alternative to the dominant storyline that “There Is No 
Alternative” to neoliberal capitalist development. Any attempt to stop the 
widespread ecological destruction and strengthen Vietnam’s resilience to climate 
change needs to come up with an alternative narrative that is more compelling and 
attractive, to motivate a significant portion of Vietnamese to change their vision of 
what development and prosperity look like.  
This paper argues that Vietnam’s climate change adaptation strategies are 
doomed to be ineffective unless the underlying economic growth imperatives and 
economic and political inequalities are addressed. Otherwise, the myriad adaptation 
reports and action plans become fairy tales, idealized plans that are unmoored from 
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the actual political and economic context of Vietnam, and of the local areas in which 
they are being implemented. Most importantly, without explicitly addressing power 
relations, climate change adaptation strategies are likely to reinforce and even 
exacerbate existing inequalities, and thus increasing vulnerability to climate change.    
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